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Black Swans and Black Elephants in Plain 
Sight:  An Empirical Review of Central Bank 
Independence 
Timothy A. Canova* 
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, it was easy to see the logic 
of delegating monetary policy to private central bankers.  It was 
widely accepted that politicians could not be trusted with 
monetary policy because of their short-term time horizons and 
fixations on their next elections.  They would be tempted to spike 
the punch bowl just when central bankers, with their longer time 
horizons, would be taking the punch bowl away from the party.1  
The credibility of the Federal Reserve in helping maintain low 
inflation seemed to confirm the conventional wisdom of keeping 
central banks insulated from politics.  Legal scholars have 
largely deferred to this orthodox economics consensus on central 
bank structure by avoiding the constitutional critique of broad 
delegations to privately-directed central banks.2  But the 
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Rapoport, Lynn Stout, and Mark Tushnet for key encouragement for my research agenda 
on central banking in American law.  I would also like to thank participants at the Class 
Crits Workshop on “Rethinking Law and Economics” at the University of Buffalo Law 
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 1 William McChesney Martin, Federal Reserve chairman in the 1950s and 1960s, is 
credited with the punch bowl aphorism. See N. Gregory Mankiw, How to Avoid Recession? 
Let the Fed Work, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007, (Sun. Money), at 4.  Mankiw, a Republican 
economist, downplayed the Federal Reserve’s failure to prevent the subprime mortgage 
crisis through regulation. Id.  Mankiw also defended the Fed’s easy monetary policy in 
2007 as an attempt to avoid recession by “spiking the punch with grain alcohol when the 
party starts to flag . . . .” Id. 
 2 The Federal Reserve is a privately-owned central bank;; each of the system’s 
twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks is owned by private commercial member banks. 
Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1982); THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 48, 50–53 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
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financial crisis and its continuing aftermath have shaken this 
orthodox paradigm of central bank independence.  Suddenly, it 
seemed that central bankers were as prone to short-term herd 
behavior as any politician, and that the Federal Reserve was not 
all that independent of the private financial interests that 
dominate its own governing boards.3  The line between regulator 
and regulated industry had become blurred as the central bank 
enabled the housing bubble with low interest rates and ever-
lower lending standards, while abandoning any meaningful 
oversight or supervisory role.  Critics charge that the central 
bank was not simply asleep at the wheel, but that it was an 
active cheerleader in all that had gone wrong in inflating a huge 
and unsustainable bubble.  Since the collapse, the Federal 
Reserve has showered trillions of dollars in subsidies on its 
private constituencies, far exceeding all other subsidies and 
stimulus packages passed by Congress combined.4 
Indeed, since the financial crisis hit in 2008, the case for 
autonomous central banking has been increasingly questioned, 
even in financial circles.5  Others see no such lessons from the 
financial collapse and subsequent bailouts.  An article by Harout 
Jack Samra warrants attention for combining the typical range 
of flawed assumptions and problematic methodologies in arguing 
for central bank independence.6 
Part I of this essay will consider the economic authorities 
relied upon by Samra, including David Ricardo and John 
 
Sys. 2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND 
FUNCTIONS 1947] (reporting that each of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks is a private 
corporation which serves a regional district and is obligated to “subscribe to the capital of 
the Federal Reserve Banks”);; MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, A HISTORY OF MONEY AND BANKING 
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE COLONIAL ERA TO WORLD WAR II 258 (2002) (quoting a Chase 
National Bank official, prior to the Act’s passage, that the Federal Reserve Act “will make 
all incorporated banks together joint owners of a central dominating power”);; WILLIAM 
GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY 277 
(1987) [hereinafter GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE] (describing “a privately controlled 
network of regional reserve banks that would be given governmental powers”); RON PAUL, 
END THE FED 23 (2009) (concluding that the Federal Reserve Act conferred “legal 
legitimacy on a cartel of the largest bankers”). 
 3 The Federal Reserve’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
includes the regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents who are appointed by boards of 
directors which are in turn selected by private commercial banks in each regional district. 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 3–4, 10 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys. Publ’n Comm. ed., 9th ed. 2005) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL RESERVE: 
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 2005]. 
 4 Div. of Supervision and Consumer Protection, The Fed. Deposit Corp., A Year in 
Bank Supervision: 2008 and a Few of Its Lessons, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, Summer 2009, 
at 3, 7. 
 5 Clive Crook, Central Bankers Get with the Politics, FIN. TIMES, May 17, 2010, at 
13. 
 6 See generally Harout Jack Samra, Central Bank Autonomy in Latin America: A 
Survey and Case Studies, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 63 (2009). 
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Maynard Keynes, towering figures in the history of economic 
thought.7  Samra overlooks conflicting views of Keynes in 
particular.8  Although Keynes endorsed the autonomy of central 
bankers he also argued that they should be motivated solely by 
the public interest.9  Keynes also endorsed the nationalization of 
the Bank of England and provided a theoretical framework for 
neutralizing monetary policy and reigning in the authority of 
central bankers and activating the fiscal capabilities of elected 
branches of government.10  A fair and balanced discussion of 
Keynes suggests, at the very least, that central bank governance 
and monetary policy are far more complex matters than 
presented by Samra and other proponents of central bank 
independence.11  Consideration of the Keynesian model in action, 
particularly during the 1940s, suggests that high economic 
growth and low inflation need not be inconsistent with a more 
accountable central bank.12  Meanwhile, the record of the Federal 
Reserve’s more recent failures suggests that autonomous central 
banking invites regulatory capture, financial instability, and 
eventual financial collapse and bailout.13 
Part II considers the empirical research relied upon by 
Samra, including studies that purportedly correlate central bank 
independence with lower inflation rates.14  The studies were all 
conducted prior to the 2008 collapse and all mimicked the flaws 
in the risk management models that contributed to the financial 
crisis by relying on far too limited time periods of historical 
data.15  By so doing, they overlooked the possibilities of so-called 
“Black Swans”—those outlier events that do not fit neatly within 
the bell-shaped curves of probabilities, but which do occur and 
reoccur in history.16  Instead, the studies all engage in a crude 
type of comparative analysis, comparing countries and inflation 
rates while ignoring all potential non-monetary factors, such as 
differences in regulatory and trade policies affecting consumer 
price levels. 
 
 7 See generally GIANNI VAGGI & PETER GROENEWEGEN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF 
ECONOMIC THOUGHT: FROM MERCANTILISM TO MONETARISM (2003). 
 8 See, e.g., Samra, supra note 6, at 69. 
 9 See infra Part I. 
 10 See infra Part I. 
 11 See infra Part I. 
 12 See infra Part I. 
 13 See infra Parts I & II.C. 
 14 See infra Part II.A. 
 15 See infra Part II.A; Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in 
the Rule of Law: From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 369, 381–82 (2009) [hereinafter Canova, Financial Market 
Failure]. 
 16 NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY 
IMPROBABLE xxii–xxiii (2010). 
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Perhaps a more fruitful approach would be longitudinal 
studies that consider changes in one particular central bank’s 
structure and macroeconomic performance over a longer time 
period.  For instance, by ignoring the data from the 1930s and 
1940s for the United States in particular, the empirical literature 
overlooks perhaps the most significant decade when the central 
bank lacked de facto independence, inflation was kept low, and 
economic growth rates were at an all-time high.17  Likewise, by 
failing to consider more recent data from the 2000s, these studies 
fail to appreciate the relationship between central bank 
independence and agency capture, deregulation of lending 
standards, growth of financial fragility and inflation of 
unsustainable financial bubbles, and enormous subsidies to 
favored financial constituents.18 
Part III responds to Samra’s reliance on a book little-known 
in the United States, Guide to the Perfect Latin American Idiot,19 
written by three highly ideological Latin American journalists—a 
book devoid of sources but long on name-calling.20  The economic 
philosophy embedded in this book is a crude monetarism, one 
which was refuted by the weight of empirical evidence in the 
early 1980s when monetarists, led by Milton Friedman, wrongly 
predicted a resurgence of inflation, and more recently by the 
evidence of the past two years, in which inflation has not kept 
pace with the huge expansion in the money supply precisely 
because of the collapse in the velocity of money, a Keynesian 
insight that monetarists conveniently overlook.  But Samra and 
The Perfect Idiot co-authors do not discuss such substantive 
issues; rather, their ad hominem line of argument seems 
intended to deflect and distract from substantive discussion. Part 
IV concludes this article with a discussion of various proposals to 
reform the structure of the Federal Reserve to make it more 
accountable and transparent.  Recent reforms in the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act are placed in 
the context of various constitutional challenges to the Federal 
Reserve.21  What has often been missing from both sides of the 
central bank debate is an appreciation for nuance and the wide 
spectrum of possible central bank structures.  All too often the 
choices are phrased as a false dichotomy between an independent 
but captured central bank or one that is dominated by the 
 
 17 See, e.g., infra Parts I & II.A. 
 18 See infra Part II. 
 19 See generally PLINIO APULEYO MENDOZA, CARLOS ALBERTO MONTANER & ALVARO 
VARGAS LLOSA, GUIDE TO THE PERFECT LATIN AMERICAN IDIOT (Michaela Lajda Ames 
trans., Madison Books 2000) (1996).  Hereinafter The Perfect Idiot. 
 20 See infra Part III. 
 21 See infra Part IV. 
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politics of daily shifts in public opinion.  In a diverse and 
pluralistic society, surely there should be other, alternative 
models that would achieve greater transparency and public 
accountability without sacrificing the objectives of price stability 
and economic growth.22 
I.  THE MISUSES OF HISTORY 
Samra opens his article with a quote by Keynes that there is 
“no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than 
to debauch the currency.”23  This was from Keynes’ prophetic 
1920 critique of the Versailles peace settlement, a critique that 
recognized the inflationary dangers from imposing huge war 
reparations on Germany.24  Defenders of central bank indepen-
dence routinely point to the hyperinflation in Weimar Germany, 
which did indeed destroy the foundations of middle class 
prosperity, but they present highly selective evidence, ignore the 
actual history, and therefore draw the wrong lessons.  Contrary 
to their arguments, the Weimar hyperinflation had little to do 
with the structure of the central bank. 
Rather, the root cause of the German hyperinflation of 1923, 
like more recent bouts of high inflation in Latin America, was the 
country’s inability to service its huge foreign debt rather than 
any purported political control of the central bank.  In May 1922, 
responding to pressure from foreign creditors Britain and France, 
Germany passed the Law on the Autonomy of the Reichsbank, 
which made the central bank independent of government.25  As 
recounted by David Marsh: “The granting of the Reichsbank’s 
independence had no effect on controlling inflation, which ran at 
1,300 percent in 1922.”26  In fact, it was this newly independent 
central bank that printed paper money around the clock while 
placing the blame for the continuing inflation squarely on the 
Allied governments for making repayment of Germany’s debts 
 
 22 JOHN R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS PLACE IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 
900–01 (1934) (proposing reform of the Federal Reserve to include representation of all 
economic stakeholders to give voice to a wide diversity of economic interests); LEON H. 
KEYSERLING, MONEY, CREDIT, AND INTEREST RATES: THEIR GROSS MISMANAGEMENT BY 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: THE FED’S ASSIST TO INFLATION, RECESSIONS, AND 
INJUSTICE AND THE READILY AVAILABLE REMEDIES IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WHOLE 
ECONOMY 111 (Conf. on Econ. Progress, Washington, D.C., 1980) (proposing that Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors and Federal Open Market Committee include fair 
representation of “business, labor, farmers, [and] consumers”). 
 23 Samra, supra note 6, at 63. 
 24 Id. at 63 n.1. 
 25 DAVID MARSH, THE MOST POWERFUL BANK 81, 252 n.46 (1992). 
 26 Id. at 81. 
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impossible when French and Belgian armies occupied the Ruhr, 
the industrial heartland of Germany’s economy, in early 1923.27 
It is unlikely that any central bank governance structure 
could have prevented the 1923 German hyperinflation.  The 
Reichsbank was already autonomous, and, in 1924, the 
hyperinflation was ended by the introduction of a new currency 
and the so-called Dawes plan, which granted Germany a 
temporary moratorium on its reparations payments.28  By 1933, 
nearly a decade after the hyperinflation had ended and with an 
even more independent central bank, the basis of German society 
was once again overturned.  Three years of Great Depression and 
mass unemployment led to the rise of Hitler.29  Keynes himself 
would focus his critique on the monetary orthodoxy that 
contributed to depression and deflation, though he largely 
ignored the implications for central bank structure in 
implementing his alternative model. 
The myth of Weimar hyperinflation should give pause to 
simplistic uses of history that ignore the full context and range of 
historical facts.30  Likewise, Samra offers a long quote by David 
Ricardo from 1824 to suggest that Ricardo “advocated for greater 
independence for monetary authorities.”31  However, in the quote 
itself, Ricardo proposes delegating monetary authority to 
commissioners “not removable from their official situation but by 
a vote of one or both Houses of Parliament.”32  That would have 
made Ricardo’s proposed monetary commissioners more 
accountable than the regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents 
sitting on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) that 
 
 27 Id. 
 28 Timothy A. Canova, Financial Liberalization, International Monetary Dis/Order, 
and the Neoliberal State, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1279, 1298–99, 1299 n.84 (2000) 
[hereinafter Canova, Financial Liberalization]. 
 29 ADAM FERGUSSON, WHEN MONEY DIES: THE NIGHTMARE OF THE WEIMAR 
COLLAPSE 213 (1975); WILLIAM SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH: A 
HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY 94–111 (1985); William Krehm, The Bank of Canada—A 
Misused Tool, in WILLIAM F. HIXSON, IT’S YOUR MONEY 121 app., 122 (1997) (discussing 
Reichsbank’s refusal in 1930 “to make loans to the democratic German government unless 
it fired its Finance Minister, the Socialist economist Rudolf Hilferding . . . [initiating] a 
tight money policy that drove unemployment to 30% and paved the way for the Nazis to 
come to power and World War II”).  It was deflationist policies in Germany that paved the 
way for Hitler and National Socialism. CONTRA KEYNES AND CAMBRIDGE: ESSAYS, 
CORRESPONDENCE 36 (Bruce Caldwell ed., 1995). 
 30 Eric Foner suggests that historical truth is not fixed and permanent, and that fact 
and interpretation can be sealed off from each other: “The very selection and ordering of 
some ‘facts’ while ignoring others is itself an act of interpretation.” ERIC FONER, WHO 
OWNS HISTORY? xvii (2002). 
 31 Samra, supra note 6, at 68. 
 32 Id. 
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makes U.S. monetary policy.33  This is not to suggest that 
Ricardo today would support making the Federal Reserve Bank 
presidents more accountable, but rather to suggest the 
uncertainties inherent in trying to find support for present-day 
policies in the words of early economists. 
Samra also asserts that Keynes “later adopted similar views 
to Ricardo’s as to the benefits of central bank independence.”34  
His only support for this assertion is an article by B.W. Fraser, 
written when Fraser served as Governor of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia, in which he quotes Keynes’ testimony before the 1913 
Royal Commission regarding an Indian central bank.35  Although 
Keynes endorsed the idea of providing such a central bank’s 
executive officers with day-to-day independence, he also 
suggested constraining that authority by “ultimate government 
responsibility,” which is not exactly a ringing endorsement of 
central bank goal independence.36  Yet, Samra equates Keynes’ 
testimony with support for central bank independence, 
presumably of the variety now predominant in maintaining anti-
Keynesian policies in much of the world today. 
To conclude that Keynes and Ricardo had similar views on 
monetary governance and policy paints with too broad a brush.  
Samra never mentions that the work of Keynes he relies on was 
written decades before Keynes’ groundbreaking 1936 classic, The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money.37  It is 
instructive to consider the evolution of and weaknesses in 
Keynes’ views on monetary governance and policy as it highlights 
the differences between autonomy and accountability as well as 
 
 33 Section 341 of the Federal Reserve Act provides for the appointment and dismissal 
of the presidents of the regional Federal Reserve Banks by the private boards of directors 
of those regional Federal Reserve Banks. Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 341 (2006).  It 
should also be noted that Ricardo’s plan for independent commissioners was never 
adopted, the Bank of England continued to issue paper money and conduct monetary 
policy for the next two centuries, and the United Kingdom was not beset by any 
hyperinflations. 
 34 Samra, supra note 6, at 69. 
 35 B.W. Fraser, Central Bank Independence: What Does it Mean?, RESERVE BANK OF 
AUSTRALIA BULLETIN 1, 2 (1994), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/ 
1994/dec/pdf/bu-1294-1.pdf.  Fraser served as Governor from 1989 to 1996. Past & Present 
Governors, RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA, http://www.rba.gov.au/about-rba/history/ 
governors/index.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2011). 
 36 Samra discusses the difference between goal independence and instrument 
independence. Samra, supra note 6, at 79–82. 
 37 Hereinafter referred to as “The General Theory.”  Samra refers to The Perfect Idiot 
as “groundbreaking,”—and perhaps it is in the annals of mean-spirited satire and ad 
hominem attacks.  The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, on the other 
hand, was truly groundbreaking and is still considered by many as “[t]he most influential 
macroeconomics book of the twentieth century.” LYNN TURGEON, THE SEARCH FOR 
ECONOMICS AS A SCIENCE: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 108 (Lynn Turgeon ed., 1996). 
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the cultural sea change in public ethics between the time of 
Keynes and the present. 
In his 1926 essay, The End of Laissez-Faire, Keynes 
suggested that in many cases the ideal location of authority 
would be “somewhere between the individual and the modern 
State.”38  Progress would lie in the recognition and growth of 
“semi-autonomous bodies within the State—bodies whose 
criterion of action within their own field is solely the public good 
as they understand it, and from whose deliberations motives of 
private advantage are excluded . . . .”39  This hardly seems to 
describe the monetary operations of today’s Federal Reserve and 
other autonomous central banks.  In just the past two years, the 
Federal Reserve has purchased some $1.25 trillion of so-called 
toxic assets from private financial institutions and extended 
another $1.5 trillion in low-interest loans to those interests.40  
There is certainly no reason to assume that motives of private 
advantage have been excluded from these central bank decisions.  
Rather, there are enormous conflicts of interest and 
opportunities for private avarice inherent in today’s culture of 
independent central banking. 
In The End of Laissez-Faire, Keynes spoke favorably of the 
Bank of England as an example of the medieval conception of 
autonomies—“bodies which in the ordinary course of affairs are 
mainly autonomous within their prescribed limitations, but are 
subject in the last resort to the sovereignty of the democracy 
 
 38 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, The End of Laissez-Faire (1926), in ESSAYS IN 
PERSUASION 312, 313 (1963). 
 39 Id.  See also JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
INTEREST, AND MONEY 372, 374 (1936) [hereinafter KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY] 
(decrying the large disparities in income and wealth that existed in his day). 
The love of money as a possession—as distinguished from the love of money as 
a means to the enjoyments and realities of life—will be recognised for what it 
is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-
pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the 
specialists in mental disease. 
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren (1930), in ESSAYS 
IN PERSUASION, supra note 38, at 358, 369. 
 40 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FAQs: MBS Purchase Program, 
http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/mbs_faq.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2011) (reporting $1.25 
trillion in Federal Reserve purchases of mortgage backed securities).  The Federal 
Reserve’s various emergency lending programs exceeded $1.6 trillion. Christian A. 
Johnson, Exigent and Unusual Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and the U.S. 
Financial Crisis 11 (Sept. 7, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1584731 (reporting $112 billion in 
Primary Credit Program; $493 billion in Term Auction Facility; $225.4 billion in Section 
13(3) lending; $234 billion in Term Securities Lending Facility; $147 billion in Primary 
Dealer Credit; $145 billion in Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual 
Fund Liquidity Facility; $349 billion in Commercial Paper Funding Facility; and $48 
billion in Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility). 
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expressed through Parliament.”41  He was also quite clear that he 
saw the central bank as motivated and incentivized to act in the 
public interest by limiting the private avarice of its shareholders 
to “conventionally adequate dividends.”42  Beyond paying such 
dividends, “the direct interest of the management [of the Bank] 
often consists in avoiding criticism from the public,” and that was 
sufficient, according to Keynes, to ensure that Bank directors 
would be motivated by the public interest.43 
Keynes saw the Bank of England as merely an extreme 
instance of institutions which were “socializing themselves” 
because of their growing size, impact on others, and their concern 
with their reputation and stability.44  This was a rather 
optimistic and unrealistic view of the capacity of semi-
autonomous institutions and actors to constrain and regulate 
themselves.  According to Robert Skidelsky, Keynes’ view “was 
driven by a belief in scientific expertise and personal 
disinterestedness which now seems alarmingly naïve”45 
[Keynes] accepted uncritically the view that captains of industry were 
constrained, by the size of their undertakings, to serve the public 
interest; and he assumed, without further argument, that an 
interconnected elite of business managers, bankers, civil servants, 
economists and scientists, all trained at Oxford and Cambridge and 
imbued with a public service ethic, would come to run these organs of 
state, whether private or public, and make them hum to the same 
tune.  He wanted to decentralize and devolve only down to the level of 
Top People.46 
The nuances and flaws of Keynes’ position on central 
banking are not reflected in Samra’s portrayal.  Keynes believed 
that central banking could be removed not just from politics but 
from the self-interest of bankers, and that it should “‘be regarded 
as a kind of beneficent technique of scientific control such as 
electricity or other branches of science are.’”47  For all his genius 
in overturning the economic orthodoxy of his day, Keynes’ 
political philosophy rested on a somewhat flawed view of human 
nature.  He could wax eloquently about the eventual euthanasia 
 
 41 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, The End of Laissez-Faire (1926), supra note 38, at 313–
14. 
 42 Id. at 315. 
 43 Id. 
 44 ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: THE ECONOMIST AS SAVIOR 1920–
1937, at 227 (1992) [hereinafter SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: THE ECONOMIST AS 
SAVIOR]; JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, The End of Laissez-Faire (1926), supra note 38, at 315. 
 45 SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: THE ECONOMIST AS SAVIOR, supra note 44, at 
228. 
 46 Id. at 227–28. 
 47 Id. at 228 (quoting Keynes). 
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of politics (as well as the euthanasia of the rentier48), but until 
that bright future arrived, assumptions of political and financial 
disinterestedness seemed premature.  The result was an inherent 
and recurring inconsistency in Keynes’ views on central banking. 
For instance, in 1932 Keynes supported the Labour Party 
plan for nationalization of the Bank of England, and yet he still 
opposed “democratic interference” in its governance.49  
Presumably, nationalization would do away with the paying of 
dividends to Bank shareholders and thereby further undermine 
the self-interested profit motive of Bank directors.  Nonetheless, 
Keynes wanted to protect the Bank’s day-to-day independence.50  
If “it was the policy and not the structure of the Bank of England 
which was at fault,” then to Keynes the remedy was to better 
educate the Bank governors in the proper principles of monetary 
management.51  His view on autonomous institutions cannot be 
separated from his faith in an aristocracy of merit motivated 
solely by the public interest and common good, an aristocracy of 
obligations and duties and limits.52  How different from today’s 
financial aristocracy—which has morphed into an increasingly 
lawless and predatory oligarchy.53  Indeed, for centuries this has 
been the very definition of oligarchy: an aristocracy that rules for 
its own selfish advantage rather than primarily for the common 
good.54 
Keynes also articulated, albeit in incomplete form, what wise 
and scientific economic management should look like during a 
prolonged downturn or so-called liquidity trap.55  He bemoaned 
 
 48 KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY, supra note 39, at 376.  A rentier is a person 
whose income comes mainly from property rents, bond interest or other investments. Id. 
 49 SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: THE ECONOMIST AS SAVIOR, supra note 44, at 
437. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 This public-regarding view of aristocracy was articulated by Ortega y Gasset: 
“Nobility is defined by the demands it makes on us—by obligations, by not rights.  
Noblesse oblige.” JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 63 (Anonymous 
trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1960) (1930). 
 53 SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND 
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 120–21 (Pantheon Books 2010). 
 54 Leo Strauss, Plato, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 33, 74 (Leo Strauss & 
Joseph Cropsey eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 3d ed. 1987) (suggesting Plato’s view that the 
difference between aristocracy and oligarchy is the difference “between lawfulness and 
lawlessness”);; James E. Holton, Marcus Tullius Cicero, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 163 (discussing Cicero’s view that aristocracy contained “within 
itself not only certain defects but even the seeds of its own destruction,” namely the 
injustice and greed of oligarchy, its “depraved counterpart”);; Muhsin Mahdi, Alfarabi, in 
HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 212 (discussing Alfarabi’s criticism of 
oligarchy as a vile regime “in which the ultimate aim of the citizen is wealth and 
prosperity for their own sakes”). 
 55 See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, The End of Laissez-Faire (1926), supra note 38, at 
317. 
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persistently high levels of unemployment and the tremendous 
and arbitrary inequalities in income and wealth that undermined 
the production and efficiency of the economic system.56  The cure, 
he suggested, was an active fiscal policy accommodated by a 
neutralized monetary policy, and implemented by deliberate 
control of currency and credit by central institutions57—a policy-
mix that both constrains and directs the goals and instruments of 
central bankers and is therefore routinely seen as incompatible 
with central bank independence.58 
In The General Theory, Keynes provided the theoretical 
framework for what would become the most active period in the 
history of U.S. public finance.59  Keynes recognized that central 
banks tend to concentrate on short-term interest rates, while 
leaving the price of long-term debt instruments to the market.60  
During a severe slump, he argued, the central bank should also 
set interest rates at low levels for longer-term government 
securities.61  This would accommodate much higher levels of 
government borrowing and spending to stimulate the economy 
and invest in long-term assets such as infrastructure, while also 
pushing down long-term interest rates for private borrowers—a 
framework completely at odds with Samra’s hostility to central 
bank accommodation of large fiscal deficits and his vision of 
central bank independence.62 
This Keynesian model was followed in the United States 
from 1941 to 1951, a decade of hyperactive fiscal policy and 
neutralized monetary policy that finally pulled the U.S. economy 
out of the Great Depression.63  Throughout this period, the 
Federal Reserve was not independent in any de facto sense.  
Instead, it took its monetary policy instructions from the White 
 
 56 Id. at 317–18. 
 57 Id. 
 58 For instance, Jácome decries a government’s direction of capital controls as an 
imposition on central bank independence. Samra, supra note 6, at 79 (quoting Luis 
Jácome H., Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Latin America During the 
1990s, at 4 (IMF, Working Paper No. 01/212, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp01212.pdf [hereinafter Jácome, Legal Central Bank 
Independence]. 
 59 See generally KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY, supra note 39. 
 60 Id. at 206. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Samra, supra note 6, at 74–77. 
 63 Robert Higgs, Wartime Prosperity? A Reassessment of the U.S. Economy in the 
1940s, 52 J. ECO. HISTORY 41, 42 (1992) (“The entire episode of apparent business-cycle 
expansion during the war years is understood by most writers as an obvious validation of 
the simple Keynesian model: enormous government spending, with huge budget deficits, 
spurred the military economy and produced multiplier effects on the civilian economy, the 
upshot being increased employment, real output, and consumption and decreased 
unemployment.”). 
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House and the Treasury.64  Although the results were impressive, 
with the highest economic growth decade in American history 
coupled with low inflation, this history is strangely left out of 
every empirical study cited by Samra.  Instead, this 1940s decade 
is apparently to be considered as an outlier, an aberration, to be 
dismissed as the special circumstance of war even though it also 
spanned the post-war period of reconstruction, the Marshall 
Plan, and the G.I. Bill of Rights, massive fiscal programs that 
altered the world for the better and ensured there would be no 
return to depression economics.65 
To appreciate the sea change in economic policy involved in 
the Keynesian model, consider the metrics.  Today, federal 
spending is about 25% of GDP; in the 1940s, spending peaked at 
nearly 45% of GDP.66  Today’s federal deficit is about 9% of GDP; 
in the 1940s, the deficit peaked at about 31% of GDP.67  Today, 
the federal debt held by the public is about 61% of GDP; in the 
1940s, it peaked at over 113% of GDP.68  Those higher spending 
and debt levels were sustainable precisely because the central 
 
 64 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 1947, supra note 2, 
at 105; LESTER V. CHANDLER, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY AND BANKING 482–83 (5th ed. 
1969). 
 65 Friedman and Schwartz dismiss the World War II high growth rates and low 
inflation rates by attributing the post-war inflation to the war years. MILTON FRIEDMAN 
& ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1960, 
at 556–58 (1963).  Higgs does much the same. Higgs, supra note 63, at 50, 52.  Meltzer 
refers to the pegged period as an anomaly and then dismisses the experience. ALLAN H. 
MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE: VOLUME 1: 1913–1951, at 738–39 (2003) 
(quoting with approval from Allan Sproul, president of the New York Federal Reserve 
Bank from 1941 to 1956 that “in war or in any other great emergency, the policy of the 
central banking system must support the national plan of action.  It seems to me equally 
clear that in less emergent circumstances it is wise for government to set-up barriers or 
buffers of protection of the central banking system from narrow political influence”).  But 
see HAROLD G. VATTER, THE U.S. ECONOMY IN WORLD WAR II 100–01 (1985) (relying on 
C.R. Whittlesey’s 1948 assessment that it may have been a mistake to remove price 
controls until civilian supply rose to meet pent-up demand). 
 66 National Priorities Project, Charts, Federal Outlays and Revenues, 1930–2015 as a 
Percentage of the GDP, http://nationalpriorities.org/en/resources/federal-budget-101/ 
charts/general/federal-outlays-and-revenues-1930-2015-perc-gdp/ (last visited Jan. 11, 
2011). 
 67 Trade, Exchange Rates, Budget Balances and Interest Rates, THE ECONOMIST, 
July 29, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/16702183?story_id=16702183; 
ECONOMIC. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC 
ADVISERS, app. 438 tbl.B-76 (1993), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/ 
erp/issue/1587/download/6006/ERP1993_Appendixes.pdf; EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL 
YEAR 2009, 24, tbl.1.2, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/ 
budget/fy2009/pdf/hist.pdf. 
 68 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE 2 
(2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/105xx/doc10521/2009BudgetUpdate_ 
Summary.pdf; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL DATA ON FEDERAL DEBT HELD BY THE 
PUBLIC (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/117xx/doc11766/2010_08_05_ 
FederalDebt.pdf; ECON. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 67. 
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bank was not independent.  Known as the “pegged period” in 
public finance, from 1942 to 1951 the Federal Reserve was 
directed by the White House and Treasury to purchase 
government securities in any amount and at any price needed to 
peg interest rates at 3/8 of 1% on short-term Treasury borrowing 
and 2.5% on long-term Treasury borrowing.69 
Contrary to today’s Washington Consensus view, the Federal 
Reserve’s loss of its independence in the 1940s did not coincide 
with higher inflation.  Meanwhile, the U.S. economy grew at real 
annual rates of 15% or more for the three peak years and more 
than doubled in output during the war.70  Private investment was 
crowded in, not out.  Industry boomed and businesses returned to 
profitability.  The United States emerged from the war with 
enormous productive capacity, as the world’s largest creditor and 
with huge trade surpluses, conditions which allowed it to play a 
commanding role on the world stage.  By the end of the war, with 
the jobless rate at only 1.2%, full-employment was a reality for 
perhaps the first and only time in American history, and the 
distribution of income became much more equitable as a result of 
the strong economy, low yields on Treasury securities, and 
progressive taxation.71 
During the 1940s period, the Federal Reserve lacked both 
goal independence and instrument independence.72  The object-
ives of the interest rate peg were set by the Treasury, and 
Congress directed a range of policy instruments.  In particular, 
the central bank was deprived of the blunt monetary instrument 
of raising either short-term or long-term interest rates.73  In 
 
 69 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 1947, supra note 2, 
at 105; CHANDLER, supra note 64, at 482–83. 
 70 Christopher J. Tassava, The American Economy During World War II, EH.NET 
ENCYLOPEDIA, Feb. 2, 2010, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/tassava.WWII (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2011); THE NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARKS PROGRAM ET AL., WORLD WAR II & 
THE AMERICAN HOME FRONT: A NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARKS THEME STUDY 3 (Oct. 
2007), available at http://www.nps.gov/ history/nhl/themes/HomefrontStudy.pdf. 
 71 LYNN TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM: THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC 
THINKING AND POLICYMAKING SINCE WORLD WAR II 5 (1996).  “The wealthiest 5 percent of 
Americans had received 30 percent [of income] in 1929 . . . by 1944 their share was down 
to 20.7 percent.” JOHN M. BLUM ET AL., THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 685 (4th ed. 1977). 
 72 Samra, supra note 6, at 79–82 (discussing goal and instrument independence). 
 73 Since the Federal Reserve could no longer ratchet up interest rates to preempt 
potential inflation during this pegged period, the federal government had to find new 
ways to keep prices stable, including price controls.  In addition, consumer purchasing 
power and inflationary pressures were dampened by bond sales to the public and highly 
progressive taxes. WILLIAM J. BARBER, DESIGNS WITHIN DISORDER: FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT, THE ECONOMISTS, AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY, 1933–
1945, at 142–51 (1996).  This approach to wartime finance had been urged by Keynes in 
his plan on “how to pay for the war.” ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYES: 
FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM 1937–1946, at 53 (2001) [hereinafter SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD 
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addition, the Federal Reserve was directed to impose selective 
credit controls and strict lending standards on its member banks, 
including interest rate ceilings and prohibitions on checking and 
savings deposits, and margin requirements on private borrowing 
for purchases of corporate securities, housing, automobiles, and 
other consumer durables—policy tools that complemented wage 
and price control authority.74  Likewise, the Federal Reserve and 
other central banks throughout the 1930s and 1940s were 
directed to impose a range of foreign exchange controls and 
engage in foreign currency operations.75  Moreover, the Treasury 
Department assumed responsibility for exchange rate policy with 
a stabilization fund that rivaled the Federal Reserve’s open 
market portfolio in size, thereby allowing the Treasury to 
circumvent the Federal Reserve, devalue the dollar, and relax 
monetary policy.76  These controls, along with the neutralization 
of monetary policy, were part of the model envisioned by Keynes 
to help an economy reach full employment without inflation.77 
 
KEYNES: FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM] (highlighting that the “Keynes Plan” which was 
formalized by Keynes in an article published in The Times in November 1939, was in 
essence a crystallization of Keynes’ ideology from as early as 1937). 
 74 CHANDLER, supra note 64, at 247–51, 484–85, 489–90; MELTZER, supra note 65, at 
602–05 (recounting the Federal Reserve’s use of selective credit controls);; Arthur 
Smithies, Uses of Selective Credit Controls, in UNITED STATES MONETARY POLICY 94, 94–
105 (American Assembly ed., 1964) (indicating that selective credit controls might be 
wise).  For the theoretical underpinnings of Keynesian policy in the U.S., see generally J. 
E. MEADE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND POLICY (C.J. Hitch ed., 1938). 
 75 FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 65, at 471–72; MELTZER, supra note 65, at 
461; FRED L. BLOCK, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISORDER 109–10 (1977); 
CHANDLER, supra note 64, at 426–27. 
 76 MELTZER, supra note 65, at 457–59; CHANDLER, supra note 64, at 468–69.  In the 
conduct of its foreign currency operations, the Federal Reserve acts “in close cooperation 
with the U.S. Treasury, which has overall responsibility for U.S. international financial 
policy.” THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 63 (Bd. of Governors of 
the Fed. Reserve Sys. ed., 8th ed. 1994) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: 
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 1994].  Meanwhile, with a favorable balance of trade, there was 
little need to sell Treasury debt abroad and an enhanced capability of spreading the debt 
widely in the U.S. among the general public. See Spending Beyond Our Means: US Trade 
Balance by Decade, MINT.COM (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.mint.com/blog/trends/spending-
beyond-our-means-us-trade-balance-by-decade (last visted Nov. 3, 2010) (showing a shift 
in U.S. balance of payments from surplus to deficit); Franklin Noll, The United States 
Public Debt, 1861 to 1975, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA fig.12 (Feb. 1, 2010, 6:21 PM), 
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/noll.publicdebt (showing rise in foreign purchases of 
Treasuries after U.S. payments go into deficit). 
 77 Keynes helped create Britain’s foreign exchange control system during World War 
II. SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM, supra note 73, at 74–77, 
194.  In the Bretton Woods negotiations that would create the International Monetary 
Fund, Keynes and the assistant U.S. treasury secretary Harry Dexter White attempted to 
construct a system of national exchange controls. LINDA MCQUAIG, THE CULT OF 
IMPOTENCE: SELLING THE MYTH OF POWERLESSNESS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 223–34 
(1998); James R. Crotty, On Keynes and Capital Flight, 21 J. ECON. LITERATURE 59, 62 
(1983). 
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All these various controls are today considered incompatible 
with central bank independence.78  Yet, this model proved re-
markably successful in keeping inflation of both consumer and 
asset prices at relatively low rates, while delivering impressive 
economic growth, high levels of employment, a more equitable 
distribution of wealth and income, and a rising middle class 
standard of living.  Even after price controls ended in 1947, 
inflation was only a temporary problem, and by 1949 prices were 
falling across the board.79  This may well have reflected the 
country’s expanded supply.80  “Federal spending did not simply 
pump up demand; massive federal investments in infrastructure 
and factories expanded the nation’s industrial capacity, thereby 
reducing inflationary pressures.”81 
In a study relied on by Samra, Luis Jácome argues against 
the combination of de jure independence and de facto political 
interference in the context of central banks in Brazil and 
Venezuela, countries with markedly different political and 
economic environments from the United States.82  Of course, 
Jácome does not consider the more positive experience of the 
Federal Reserve, which was legally independent in the 1940s, but 
as a practical matter lacked de facto independence yet did not 
lead to high inflation or other negative economic outcomes.83  
Rather, the increased policy direction provided by Congress, the 
Treasury, and the White House reflected a deeper discussion and 
wider range of interests in the formulation of monetary policy.84 
 
 78 Fraser, supra note 35, at 5. 
 79 Historical Inflation Data from 1914 to the Present, INFLATIONDATA.COM, 
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/HistoricalInflation.aspx?dsInflation_curr
entPage=5 (last visted Nov. 3, 2010). 
 80 VATTER, supra note 65, at 100–01.  For discussion on the end of the pegged period, 
see Gerald A. Epstein & Juliet B. Schor, The Federal Reserve-Treasury Accord and the 
Construction of the Postwar Monetary Regime in the United States, 7 SOCIAL CONCEPT 7, 
7–48 (1995). 
 81 Timothy A. Canova, The Federal Reserve We Need, THE AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 11, 
2010, http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_federal_reserve_we_need [hereinafter 
Canova, The Federal Reserve We Need]. 
 82 Agustín Carstens & Luis Jácome H., Latin American Central Bank Reform: 
Progress and Challenges 6 (IMF, Working Paper No. 05/114, 2005), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp05114.pdf. 
 83 Inflation was kept low during the boom years of the 1940s.  In fact, the annual 
inflation was below three percent for the final three years of the war, from October 1942 
to August 1945. BLUM ET AL., supra note 71, at 685 (“From October 1942 to the end of the 
Pacific war, consumers’ prices rose only 8.7 percent.”). 
 84 John Commons, a leading Institutionalist economist of the 1930s, advocated for 
such wider participation in the formulation of monetary policy. COMMONS, supra note 22, 
at 900–01; Charles J. Whalen, Full Employment with Liberty: John R. Commons’ 
Perspective and Its Continuing Relevance, 44 J. ECO. ISSUES 559, 565 (2010).  This was the 
position of Leon Keyserling, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers in the 
administration of President Harry S. Truman. KEYSERLING, supra note 22, at 111 
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In more recent years, without such policy direction and input 
from elected branches, the Federal Reserve has focused almost 
exclusively on one policy objective (low consumer price inflation), 
and has used only one policy instrument (changes in short-term 
interest rates).85  All other policy objectives, such as maximizing 
employment and ensuring financial stability, were secondary at 
best, and often totally ignored.86  What a sharp contrast to the 
1940s, when the political direction of policy goals and 
instruments helped the Federal Reserve resist domination and 
capture by its big bank constituency, which was crucial in 
achieving a host of policy objectives, including full employment, 
low inflation, and stability of the financial system. 
If the 1940s was clearly the low point for central bank 
independence, it was the high point for political accountability.  
The Federal Reserve chairman during this period was Marriner 
Eccles, a successful Utah banker whose support for higher 
federal spending had anticipated the fiscal ideas of Keynes.87  In 
the 1930s, he had pushed for structural reform of the Fed to 
remove the “banker interest” from its crucial policy-making 
Federal Open Market Committee.88  Although Eccles came up 
short in that effort, he remained committed to a model of 
governance that prevented the central bank from undermining 
the Treasury’s fiscal program.89  Eccles and other Federal 
Reserve governors demonstrated the ideals of self-restraint and 
concern for the public good that Keynes assumed should motivate 
the actions of autonomous central bankers. 
Throughout the 1940s, the Federal Reserve’s willingness and 
ability to accommodate huge Treasury deficits while imposing a 
range of selective credit and capital controls reflected both its 
relative independence from private financial interests and its 
accountability to democratically elected institutions.  This period 
provides a model of what a democratically-accountable central 
bank would look like when working with elected branches to 
achieve the three primary objectives of Keynesian economics: 
(1) maintaining genuine full-employment; (2) reducing the 
 
(proposing that Federal Reserve Board of Governors and Federal Open Market 
Committee include “fair representation of business, labor, farmers, [and] consumers”). 
 85 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Monetary Policy Objectives and Tools in a Low-Inflation Environment, Address at the 
Revisiting Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Environment Conference (Oct. 15, 2010) 
(highlighting that low inflation and short term interest rates have been the modern 
standard, but noting that some consequences have arisen as a result of such a policy). 
 86 Id. 
 87 MELTZER, supra note 65, at 464–65. 
 88 Id. at 468–69, 476. 
 89 Id. 
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tremendous inequalities in wealth and income that undermine 
any sustainable recovery; and (3) putting an end to the 
monopolistic structures and financial practices that harm 
taxpayers and consumers alike.90 
Unfortunately, few economists ever learn of this period in 
Federal Reserve history.  Not surprisingly, this most successful 
decade in U.S. history is ignored by Samra and the empirical 
studies upon which he relies, and has been all but airbrushed 
from most mainstream texts, including the economics textbook 
co-authored by the present Federal Reserve chairman, Ben 
Bernanke.91  It is a telling omission that Bernanke, although 
routinely hailed as an authority on the Great Depression, does 
not mention the monetary regime—a politically-directed central 
bank—that accommodated the hyperactive fiscal policy that 
lifted the U.S. economy out of the Depression once and for all 
after a decade of drift. 
II.  EMPIRICAL MYOPIA, BLACK SWANS, AND BLACK ELEPHANTS 
Every empirical study relied on by Samra suffers the same 
flaws of selective presentation of evidence and myopic focus on 
limited variables and limited time periods.  None of the studies 
consider data from the 1920s to the mid-1950s, thereby avoiding 
important “black swan” events, including the 1929 stock market 
crash, the financial panics of the early 1930s, the Great 
Depression, and the economic boom of the 1940s.92  In this way 
they mimic the risk management models used by big banks and 
credit rating agencies in the past decade to ignore the possibility 
of sharp drops in asset prices.93  By dismissing such large 
 
 90 Canova, Financial Market Failure, supra note 15, at 373 (restating the primary 
policy objectives of ABBA P. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL: PRINCIPLES OF 
WELFARE ECONOMICS 3 (1947)). 
 91 See generally ROBERT H. FRANK & BEN S. BERNANKE, PRINCIPLES OF MACRO-
ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2007) (providing Federal Reserve and monetary history that includes 
pre-pegged and post-pegged periods, but nothing on the pegged period itself); STEPHEN G. 
CECCHETTI, MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS (2006) (avoiding any discussion 
of the fiscal and monetary expansion of the pegged period).  See also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT AND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL 
OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS 280–81 tbl.B-1 (1996) (providing GDP statistics no earlier than 
1959); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MACROECONOMICS 191–211 (18th 
ed. 2005) (historical overview of the Federal Reserve and monetary policy omitting any 
mention of pegged period); HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 424–26 (6th ed. 2002) 
(discussing federal deficits no earlier than 1970).  Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve 
encourages mis-education and ignorance of the pegged period through its financial 
education and literacy programs as well as its practice of keeping hundreds of economists 
on paid retainers while restricting the dissemination and scope of their research. ROBERT 
D. AUERBACH, DECEPTION AND ABUSE AT THE FED: HENRY B. GONZALEZ BATTLES ALAN 
GREENSPAN’S BANK 141–47 (2008). 
 92 See generally TALEB, supra note 16. 
 93 Canova, Financial Market Failure, supra note 15, at 381–82. 
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historical events as outliers and aberrations, these risk models 
effectively assumed that housing prices would always keep 
rising.  Likewise, Samra also ignored the more recent black 
swans, the financial collapse of 2008 and its continuing 
aftermath, as well as the rise of China as an economic power 
without an independent central bank—events so recent and so 
significant that to overlook them is more like missing a black 
elephant than a black swan.94 
A. Autistic Economics and Inflation Myopia 
All of the studies relied on by Samra, and in fact all of the 
many studies generated by the research departments of central 
banks and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) confine their 
analyses mostly to the 1980s and 1990s while overlooking any 
and all non-monetary explanations for variations in inflation 
rates.  It is worth noting the professional affiliations of the 
authors of many of the studies cited by Samra, most of whom 
were associated with the IMF, World Bank, Bank for 
International Settlements, and the Federal Reserve, institutions 
with long-standing commitments to the model of central bank 
independence, and in the case of the Federal Reserve, a direct 
bureaucratic self-interest and perhaps a financial interest in 
maintaining the model.95 
In addition to the truncated period and focus of analysis, 
these studies share a fixation on one variable: the rate of 
consumer price inflation, while ignoring all other kinds of price 
inflation, even hyperinflations of asset prices.  This fixation on 
one variable while ignoring all others is characteristic of the 
orthodoxy in economics.  In recent years, a critical movement has 
developed within economics that challenges this orthodox 
approach as “autistic” for pursuing econometric modeling as “an 
end in itself” and thereby “cutting off economics from reality.”96  
 
 94 A “black elephant” is a combination of “the elephant sitting in the room,” which 
everyone knows is important but is a taboo that no one will talk about, and “black swan,” 
which is considered an extreme or unlikely event that undermines prior risk management 
strategies.  The black elephant has been defined as “an event which is extremely likely 
and widely predicted by experts, but people attempt to pass it off as a black swan when it 
finally happens.” Vinay Gupta, On Black Elephants, THE BUCKY-GANDHI DESIGN 
INSTITUTION (Apr. 27, 2009, 8:31 AM), http://vinay.howtolivewiki.com/blog/flu/on-black-
elephants-1450. 
 95 See, e.g., Jácome, Legal Central Bank Independence, supra note 58, at 5–6 
(discussing Latin American structural reforms to comply with International Monetary 
Fund “best practices” for central bank autonomy);; JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING 
GLOBALIZATION WORK 28, 57 (2006) [hereinafter STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION 
WORK]. 
 96 POST-AUTISTIC ECONOMICS NEWSLETTER, No. 1, Sept. 2000, 
http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/wholeissues/issue1.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).  
Autism is characterized by a narrow range of interests, restricted use of language, lack of 
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According to this critique, mainstream economics suffers from a 
variety of symptoms of autism in its uncontrolled use of 
mathematics, repetitive fixation with abstract econometric 
modeling, and complete avoidance of social context and empirical 
evidence, including historical facts, the functioning of 
institutions, and the study of the behaviors and strategies of 
agents.97  The studies relied on by Samra that attempt to 
correlate central bank independence with low inflation are within 
this autistic tradition: they ignore empirical evidence that would 
correlate central bank independence with asset price inflations, 
unsustainable financial bubbles, high levels of unemployment, 
top-heavy distributions of income, agency capture, financial 
fragility, and central bank subsidies for financial elites. 
These studies are also based on flawed assumptions about 
the nature and causes of consumer price inflation.  Luis Jácome’s 
2001 study assumes that “inflation is essentially a monetary 
phenomenon”98 and focuses on three relatively brief periods: 
1980–1989, when Latin American countries were beset by the so-
called Third World debt crisis and sharply rising interest rates 
on their foreign debts; and 1990–1995 and 1996–2000, periods of 
recovery in much of Latin America thanks in large part to 
resolution of the debt crisis and a revival in agriculture and 
commodity exports. 
The most recent episodes of high inflation in Latin America 
have occurred in the context of foreign indebtedness and balance 
of payments crises.99  Dependence on foreign bank loans, inflows 
 
social reciprocity, inability to appreciate social context, repetitive behavior, repetitive use 
of idiosyncratic language, and inflexible adherence to specific, non-functional routines or 
rituals. Diagnosis of Autism, AUTISM SPEAKS, http://www.autismspeaks.org/diagnosis/ 
index.php (last visited Jan. 11, 2011). 
 97 POST-AUTISTIC ECONOMICS NEWSLETTER, supra note 96.  According to Marc 
Lavoie, the post-autistic movement has criticized mainstream economics for “the 
dogmatism of their teaching and the irrelevance of formalized models that seemed to 
relate to some imaginary world rather than to the real world.” MARC LAVOIE, 
INTRODUCTION TO POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS xiv (2006).  See also Milton Friedman, in 
CONVERSATIONS WITH LEADING ECONOMISTS: INTERPRETING MODERN MACROECONOMICS 
124, 137 (Brian Snowdon & Howard R. Vane eds., 1999) (quoting Friedman that 
“economics has become increasingly an arcane branch of mathematics rather than dealing 
with real economic problems”). 
 98 Jácome, Legal Central Bank Independence, supra note 58, at 29 (asserting that 
“inflation is essentially a monetary phenomenon”).  See also Samra, supra note 6, at 64 
n.9 (citing to Jácome’s paper).  Jácome finds a strong correlation between central bank 
independence and low inflation during the 1991–2001 period, although that finding also 
required that Argentina and Venezuela be excluded from the analysis. Jácome, Legal 
Central Bank Independence, supra note 58, at 23–24. 
 99 Mark Weisbrot, Ctr. for Econ. & Pol’y Research, Latin America’s Electoral 
Leftward Shift: The Importance of Economics, (Mar. 14, 2006), available at 
http://www.cepr.net/events/200603_latam/2006_03_lagrowth_transcript.htm [hereinafter 
Weisbrot, Latin America’s Electoral Leftward Shift] (providing the graphic charts which 
accompany Weisbrot’s speech).  There were serious inflations in the 1970s and 1980s in 
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of portfolio capital, and the “dollarization” of domestic bank 
accounts led to overvalued currencies and huge trade imbalances 
financed by yet more capital inflows contributing to 
unsustainable debt burdens.100  When interest rates rose and 
painful adjustments were imposed by international bond markets 
and International Monetary Fund loan conditions, everything 
went in reverse.  Collapsing currencies led to ever-rising prices of 
imported goods, including necessities such as food and fuel, and 
falling prices for exports, including exports of commodities in 
particular.  As countries found it increasingly difficult to meet 
their debt service obligations and import bills, some responded by 
printing money, leading to even higher inflation rates.  Market 
fundamentalists blame the central banks for monetizing debt 
while ignoring the underlying causes that led to such poor 
decisions.101  Moreover, monetizing debt in the middle of a 
balance of payments and foreign debt crisis is very different from 
monetizing debt to invest in real productive resources and 
expand the industrial capacity and supply of a country. 
Since Jácome begins with monetarist assumptions, it is not 
surprising that he sees independent central banks and tighter 
monetary policy as the only explanations for the low inflation 
period.102  Foreign debt burdens and sharply higher interest 
payments imposed from without are never addressed.  According 
to critics of Jácome’s approach, the failure “to control adequately 
for other factors that might account for cross-country differences 
in inflation” is a major deficiency in the literature that purports 
to attribute low inflation to central bank independence.103  In 
fact, Carl Walsh has noted one study that did control for other 
potential determinants of inflation and “found little additional 
role for central bank independence.”104 
Significant non-monetary factors contributed to global 
inflation in the 1970s in particular, including recurring balance 
of payments crises and International Monetary Fund designed 
adjustment.105 The Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay.  This was also a period of sharply 
rising oil prices that had nothing to do with central bank structure or monetary policies in 
Latin America, and which contributed to balance of payments problems, dependence on 
foreign inflows of portfolio capital, falling currencies, and rising prices. Id. 
 100 Weisbrot, Latin America’s Electoral Leftward Shift, supra note 99 (providing the 
graphic charts which accompany Weisbrot’s speech). 
 101 See Jácome, Legal Central Bank Independence, supra note 58, at 29–30. 
 102 See id. at 30. 
 103 Carl E. Walsh, Central Bank Independence, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS 728, 730 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 104 Id. 
 105 See generally CHERYL PAYER, THE DEBT TRAP: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND AND THE THIRD WORLD (1974). 
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Countries (OPEC) quadrupled the price of oil in 1973 and 
doubled the price of oil in 1979.106  As a result, Western banks 
helped “recycle” the so-called petrodollars deposited by OPEC 
countries into loans to Latin American and other Third World 
countries, as developing countries were then called, so they could 
continue paying for oil imports.107  But this recycling of petro-
dollars ended badly for most of Latin America when U.S. banks 
raised interest rates sharply on their loans in the early 1980s.108 
Studies by Jácome and others do not consider the following 
counter-factual: if Latin American countries had independent 
central banks at the time of the 1980s debt crisis, would such a 
model have then been discredited and would the reforms then 
have gone in the opposite direction leading to greater central 
bank accountability which should then receive much of the credit 
for all the good inflation numbers resulting from resolution of the 
debt crisis and export-led recovery?  In fact, Chile provides just 
such a counter-factual example, although one would not realize 
this by reading Samra’s ahistorical case study of Chile, as he 
provides few dates and makes no attempt to correlate central 
bank reforms with actual economic indicators.109 
Although Chile’s central bank was made independent in the 
early 1980s, average annual inflation exceeded 20% throughout 
the 1980s and 17% through the mid-1990s.110  Moreover, Chilean 
inflation was brought down to 6% a year in the late-1990s, but 
not because of any change in central bank monetary vigilance.111  
Rather, lower inflation rates coincided with increased regulation 
of portfolio capital markets imposed by the elected government, 
resulting in greater exchange rate and price stability.112  Chile’s 
 
 106 JEFFRY FRIEDEN, GLOBAL CAPITALISM: ITS FALL AND RISE IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 364, 368 (2006); Jack L. Hervey, Changing U.S. Trade Patterns, in HISTORY OF 
THE U.S. ECONOMY SINCE WORLD WAR II 444, 446 (Harold G. Vatter & John F. Walker 
eds., 1996). 
 107 GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE, supra note 2, at 340. 
 108 STEVEN SOLOMON, THE CONFIDENCE GAME: HOW UNELECTED CENTRAL BANKERS 
ARE GOVERNING THE CHANGED GLOBAL ECONOMY 22 (1995) (discussing the Reagan 
administration’s approach to treating the debt crisis of four particular countries—Mexico, 
Argentina, Brazil, and Yugoslavia—as financial problems that demanded International 
Monetary Fund austerity programs); GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE, supra note 2, at 
437.  See generally DARRELL DELAMAIDE, DEBT SHOCK (1984). 
 109 See Samra, supra note 6, at 84–86. 
 110 Eva Gutiérrez, Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank 
Independence: Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean 16 tbl.3 (IMF, Working 
Paper No. 03/53, 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/ 
wp0353.pdf. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the 
Neoliberal Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1571, 1621–22, 1626 (1999) [hereinafter 
Canova, Banking and Financial Reform] (discussing Chile’s encaje program which 
required foreign investors and lenders to deposit 30% of the investment or loan into a 
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high inflation in the earlier period, and its disinflation in the 
later period, had far less to do with central bank structure than 
with foreign debt burdens, exchange rates, and the effectiveness 
of financial regulation.  As discussed above, Chile’s high inflation 
rates of the 1980s occurred under an independent central bank, 
and the disinflation of the 1990s occurred when the central 
bank’s instrument independence was undermined by capital 
controls.113  Yet Jácome does not consider any explanation other 
than a crude monetarist one. 
In another Jácome paper co-authored with Agustín Carstens 
in 2005, the authors likewise have a relatively short view of 
economic history, comparing changes in macroeconomic 
indicators from the 1980s to 2003.114  Samra relies on this paper 
in particular for his statement that “most scholars agree” that 
central bank autonomy is “a sine qua non of monetary or price 
stability.”115  If this is so, the statement says more about blind 
orthodoxy than the merits of central bank independence.  One is 
hard pressed to find strong empirical support for such a sweeping 
conclusion, which perhaps confuses cause and effect.116  
According to Adam Posen, reforms leading to central bank 
independence often reflect the presence of an already strong 
political constituency for low inflation.117  For instance, as Latin 
American countries pulled out of the debt crisis and experienced 
a resurgence in their exports, the resulting economic growth may 
have strengthened the political forces pushing for central bank 
independence, as well as a host of other policies—such as trade 
 
non-interest bearing account with the central bank for a full year or pay a 3% tax to 
recover the deposit); GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE’S WORKSHOP: LATIN AMERICA, THE UNITED 
STATES, AND THE RISE OF THE NEW IMPERIALISM 204 (2006) (discussing Chile’s break with 
“free-market dogma” in the 1980s and turn to state promotion of exports and use of 
regulatory laws “including some enacted by the vilified Allende government”). 
 113  See supra Part II.A. 
 114 Carstens & Jácome, supra note 82, at 15 tbl.6; Samra, supra note 6, at 65 n.12 
(citing to Carstens & Jacome’s paper).  The paper’s conclusion that central bank 
independence explains the reduction in inflation once again ignores all other possible 
explanations and empirical evidence from earlier periods. Carstens & Jácome, supra note 
82, at 17. 
 115 Samra, supra note 6, at 65 & n.12. 
 116 Even Samra hedges this sweeping conclusion by referring to Federal Reserve 
Board Chairman Ben Bernanke’s caveat that “the evidence for developing countries is 
more mixed.” Samra, supra note 6, at 69 (quoting Bernanke as stating that “the evidence 
for developing countries is more mixed” with regard to the connection between central 
bank independence and the promotion of low inflation). 
 117 Walsh, Central Bank Independence, supra note 103, at 728, 730; Adam Posen, Why 
Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There is No Institutional Fix 
for Politics, in 7 FINANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 40, 47 (Richard O’Brien ed., 
1993)). 
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liberalization, fiscal austerity, and wage suppression—which 
would also have contributed to lower inflation rates.118 
Samra also relies on a study by Eva Gutiérrez arguing the 
high inflation in Latin America during the late 1980s and early 
1990s was caused by the region’s high fiscal deficits, which were 
monetized by central banks that were pressured by elected 
governments with short-term objectives.119  Gutiérrez also 
attributes the decline in inflation in the 1990s to reforms that 
made central banks more autonomous.120  Again, like all the 
other studies relied on by Samra,121 Gutiérrez’ study does not 
consider data from earlier key periods such as the 1940s and 
early 1950s.  Moreover, Gutiérrez even ignores the high economic 
growth rates and low inflation rates across Latin America during 
the 1960s, prior to central bank independence, and the OPEC oil 
price hikes and the ensuing debt crisis.122  Moreover, like Jácome, 
she does not consider any other factors that may have led to later 
declines in inflation and improvements in economic growth such 
as the resolution of Latin America’s debt crisis and higher export 
earnings. 
 
118 See Michael Parkin, Inflation, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 293, 299 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) 
(discussing fiscal causes of inflation). 
 119 See Gutiérrez, supra note 110, at 15 (stating that inflation during the 1980s and 
early 1990s was, at root, due to the high fiscal deficits that were financed by monetization 
by central banks). 
 120 See id. at 16, 23 (linking lower inflation to “entrench[ing] the independence of the 
central bank in the constitution”). 
 121 See, e.g., Luis I. Jácome & Francisco Vásquez, Any Link Between Legal Central 
Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean 12 
tbl.1, 15 fig.2, 16 tbl.3 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 05/75, 2005), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp0575.pdf (focusing on data from the 
1990s); Samra, supra note 6, at 71 n.43 (citing to Jácome & Vásquez’ paper); Charles T. 
Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst, Commentary, Central Bank Independence: The Key to 
Price Stability?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, Sept. 1, 2006, at 1, available at 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2006/0901.pdf (focusing on the 1955–
2000 period); Samra, supra note 6, at 73 n.58 (citing to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland commentary); Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers, Central Bank 
Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 151, 160 app. tbl.A1, 161 app. tbl.A2 (1993) (focusing on two 
periods: 1955–1988 and 1973–1988); Samra, supra note 6, at 72 n.56 (citing to Alesina & 
Summers’ article);; Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting: 
Monetary Policy Paradigms for the Next Millennium?, 1997 NEW ENG. ECON. REV. 19, 25 
(1997), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/neer/neer1997/neer197b.pdf (focusing 
on the period of 1970 to the late 1990s); Samra, supra note 6, at 72 n.53 (citing to Fuhrer’s 
article). 
 122 See EDWIN WILLIAMSON, THE PENGUIN HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 620 tbl.3 (rev. 
ed. 2009) (reporting high economic growth rates across Latin America in the 1960s and 
sharp declines in the 1980s); id. at 621 tbl.4 (reporting relative price stability across Latin 
America in the 1960s, followed by huge increases in inflation in the 1970s and 1980s); id. 
at 622 tbl.5, 623 tbl.6 (reporting rising total external debt levels across Latin America 
from 1978 to 1984); id. at 624 tbl.7 (reporting rising external debt and debt service levels 
across Latin America from 1975 to 1985). 
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Likewise, Samra relies heavily on a study by Carlstrom and 
Fuerst on the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, once considered the 
least independent of central banks, which was made independent 
in 1989 and now ranks among the more independent.123  The 
country’s inflation rate fell from an average 7.6% in 1955–1988 to 
2.7% in 1988–2000.124  Of course, the inflation numbers are 
elevated for the early period simply by including the 1970s, the 
peak years of inflation due in large part to successive price hikes 
by OPEC, a global oil cartel.125 
Carlstrom and Fuerst acknowledge that, with reference to 
the United States, changes in central bank independence “were 
not responsible for the large inflation run-up that occurred 
during the 1970s in the United States and throughout the 
world.”126  Likewise, the decline in U.S. inflation was “not caused 
by changes in [Federal Reserve] independence but by other forces 
that have lowered the worldwide inflation rate.”127 But, 
apparently the authors saw no reason to extend those caveats to 
New Zealand.  Instead, Carlstrom and Fuerst must engage in 
“holding everything else equal” to conclude that if New Zealand 
had “an independence score” as high between 1955 and 1988 as it 
does today, then annual inflation would have been 3.4% instead 
of 7.6% during that period.128  Apparently, in this fictitious world, 
the OPEC price increases and global inflation would simply have 
ceased having any effect on the New Zealand economy.129 
Carlstrom and Fuerst then broaden their conclusion beyond 
New Zealand to the global economy once more: “[H]olding 
everything else equal, the increase in central banks’ 
independence would have lowered the average inflation rate 
 
 123 Samra, supra note 6, at 73. 
 124 Carlstrom & Fuerst, supra note 121, at 1. 
 125 Vlad Grinkevich, OPEC Marks 50th Anniversary, FINANCIAL (Oct. 9, 2010), 
http://www.finchannel.com/Main_News/Op-Ed/70381_OPEC_marks_50th_anniversary.  
See also Andrew C. Udin, Slaying Goliath: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. 
Antitrust Law to OPEC, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1321, 1327–28 (2001) (“A ‘cartel’ is an 
association of producers and/or consumers of a certain product, formed for the purpose of 
manipulating the product’s price in a given market . . . .  OPEC is widely known as the 
most prominent cartel in the international economy[.]”);; Tim McMahon, Inflation 
Similarities Between the 2000s and the 1970s, INFLATIONDATA.COM (Apr. 21, 2006), 
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Articles/2000_vs_1970s.asp (noting that in the 
1970s, inflation rates had surpassed 14%); John Keefe, What Causes Inflation? Lessons 
from the 1970s, Vol.3, CBS MONEYWATCH.COM (May 26, 2009), 
http://moneywatch.bnet.com/economic-news/blog/macro-view/what-causes-inflation-
lessons from-the-1970s-vol-3/553/ (“Many people who lived through the 1970s associate 
high inflation with sharply higher oil prices, due to an embargo on Arab oil in 1973.”). 
 126 Carlstrom & Fuerst, supra note 121, at 3. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 2. 
 129 See supra note 125. 
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worldwide from 5.6% to 3.8%.”130  Again, there is no discussion 
about how central bank independence would have prevented the 
OPEC countries from forming a cartel and raising global oil 
prices.  They offer caveats that central bank independence was 
not the only factor in reducing inflation rates and that the impact 
of independence is more mercurial in developing nations.131  But 
it is telling that such caveats are hedged in their conclusion 
section, which offers the definitive statement that central bank 
independence is the “most effective way” to ensure low inflation 
and that “nearly 2 percentage points of developed countries’ 
average decline in inflation over time is the direct results [sic] of 
their central banks’ increased independence.”132  Here we see a 
pattern of studied ignorance: all non-monetary factors must be 
ignored to maintain the case for central bank independence. 
Likewise, Samra relies on a study by Larry Summers and 
Alberto Alesina, finding a strong relationship between central 
bank independence and lower inflation across more than a dozen 
industrialized countries.133  According to this study, countries 
with high degrees of central bank independence generally had 
lower inflation rates than countries with less independent central 
 
 130 Id. 
 131 Carlstrom & Fuerst, supra note 121, at 1–3. 
 132 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
 133 Alesina & Summers, supra note 121, at 159, 160–61 tbls.A1 & A2 (analyzing the 
independence of various countries’ central banks and concluding that “[t]hese results 
suggest that the monetary discipline associated with central bank independence reduces 
the level and variability of inflation”).  As Deputy Secretary, and then Secretary, of the 
Treasury from 1999–2001, Summers played an active role in pushing central bank 
independence around the world and deregulation of banking and derivatives in the 
United States. See Lawrence H. Summers: Director of the National Economic Council and 
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/director (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).  
See also Joshua Zumbrun, Clinton Calls Advice He Got on Derivatives ‘Wrong’ (Update1), 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 19, 2010, 7:07 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
news/2010-04-19/clinton-calls-advice-he-got-on-derivatives-wrong-update1-.html 
(“[Summers’] argument was that derivatives didn’t need transparency because they were 
‘expensive and sophisticated and only a handful of people will buy them and they don’t 
need any extra protection’ . . . .”).  Summers stated in an interview that 
we’ve got a very clear sense, as I know the Fed does, of the respective roles of 
national fiscal authorities and national central banks.  And that has got to be 
premised on a central bank’s independence.  It’s got to be premised on a central 
bank’s making judgments about overall monetary and financial policy, not 
about specific subsidies. 
David Wessel, Larry Summers on Ben Bernanke–Sort of, REAL TIME ECONOMICS  
(Apr. 14, 2009, 8:52 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/04/14/larry-summers-on-
ben-bernanke-sort-of/.  At the time of this writing, he is director of the White House 
National Economic Council. See Lawrence H. Summers: Director of the National Economic 
Council and Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
COUNCIL, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/director (last visited Oct. 23, 
2010). 
Do Not Delete 3/17/2011 12:20 AM 
262 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 14:237 
banks.134  But this conclusion is easily dispelled by expanding the 
time frame of the longitudinal studies and considering non-
monetary factors.  For instance, the annual inflation rate in the 
United States averaged about 6% during the 1941–1951 decade, 
when the Federal Reserve was politically-directed.135  This was 
roughly the average annual U.S. inflation rate for the 1973–1988 
period, when the Federal Reserve enjoyed far more in-
dependence.136  Perhaps Samra would object to including the 
inflationary 1970s in such a comparison, but of course that is 
exactly what all of these self-serving studies have been doing to 
impugn the record of politically accountable central banks in 
Latin America. 
Although Samra asserts that “most scholars agree” that 
central bank autonomy is closely correlated with lower inflation, 
the actual evidence is far less clear.137  Eiffinger and de Haan 
present the findings of more than two dozen studies, not one of 
which considers the empirical evidence prior to 1950, thereby 
ignoring the most important decade of the twentieth century, as 
discussed above, when the Federal Reserve and other central 
banks lacked independence while supporting the century’s 
highest economic growth rates and low inflation rates.138  Even 
with such limited time frames, the studies were less than 
uniform in finding any statistical relation between central-bank 
independence and inflation, and many found no relation between 
central-bank independence and economic growth, interest rates, 
or budget deficits.139 
In summarizing the empirical studies, including the 
Allesina/Summers study, Carl Walsh has stated that “[a]mong 
developed economies, central bank independence was found to be 
negatively correlated with average inflation.”140  Walsh noted, 
however, that data supporting this contention was based on “the 
high inflation years of the 1970s.”141  In addition, the studies 
mostly omitted consideration of the 1950s and 1960s, and 
completely overlooked the 1930s and 1940s.  Moreover, these 
 
 134 Alesina & Summers, supra note 121, at 159. 
 135 Historical Inflation Data from 1914 to the Present, supra note 79.  See also supra 
Part I. 
 136 Alesina & Summers, supra note 121, at 161 app. tbl.A2. 
 137 Samra, supra note 6, at 65. 
 138 Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob de Haan, Special Paper, The Political Economy 
of Central-Bank Independence, PRINCETON INT’L FIN. SEC. 64–65 tbls.B1 & B2 (1996), 
available at http://www.princeton.edu/~ies/IES_Special_Papers/SP19.pdf.  See also supra 
Part I (noting the period of 1941–1951). 
 139 Eijffinger & de Haan, supra note 138, at 66–69 tbls.B2–B4. 
 140 Walsh, Central Bank Independence, supra note 103, at 728–29. 
 141 Id. at 729. 
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studies have also been criticized for failing to consider any non-
monetary factors that might explain changes in inflation rates.142 
Walsh further noted that for developing countries, when 
“causality is difficult to establish; is inflation high because of 
political interference that leads to rapid turnover of central bank 
officials?  Or are central bank officials tossed out because they 
can’t keep inflation down?”143  Again, implicit in such questions is 
the recognition that inflation may at times be caused by other 
non-monetary factors beyond the control of central bankers.  Yet 
Samra indulges, quite uncritically, in monetarist assumptions.  
He quotes at length from Milton Friedman denigrating such 
possible causes of inflation as “‘greedy businessmen, grasping 
trade unions, . . . Arab sheikhs, . . . or anything else that seems 
remotely plausible.’”144  According to Friedman, any of these can 
produce rising prices for individual goods or services, but “‘they 
cannot produce rising prices for goods in general . . . .  [T]hey 
cannot produce continuing inflation.’”145  There is actually no 
empirical analysis in Friedman’s argument; rather, this is 
ideology and belief.  There is no recognition that the quadrupling 
of the price of just one item—petroleum—could have devastating 
ripple effects throughout the economy, raising prices for goods in 
general, particularly since that commodity is an input in the 
production of so many other goods.146 
Samra also quotes Friedman that 
‘[t]here is probably no other proposition in economics that is as well 
established’ as the principle that ‘[i]nflation occurs when the quantity 
of money rises appreciably more rapidly than output, and the more 
rapid the rise in quantity of money per unit of output, the greater the 
rate of inflation.’147 
 
 142 Id. at 730.  Although Samra quotes from Walsh’s summary at some length about 
the definitions of goal independence and instrument independence, he does not discuss 
the criticisms raised by Walsh about the empirical studies of developing countries related 
to methodology, causation, scope of analysis, and underlying theory. See, e.g., Samra, 
supra note 6, at 80. 
 143 See Walsh, Central Bank Independence, supra note 103, at 728, 730. 
 144 See Samra, supra note 6, at 76 (quoting Friedman). 
 145 See id. (quoting Friedman). 
 146 James Galbraith disputes the view that the 1970s inflation somehow vindicates 
Milton Friedman and undermines Keynesian economics.  The inflation resulted from the 
Vietnam War, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the rise of OPEC and major oil shocks in 
1973–1974 and 1979; huge events that were much larger than any “monetary mischief.”  
Therefore, the solution need not have been super-tight money, high interest rates, deep 
recession, and even less accountability for central bankers.  Rather, “[t]he renewed 
application of less drastic measures might have been enough.” James K. Galbraith, We 
Are All Keynesians Again: Why Ben Bernanke Isn’t Listening to Robert Samuelson, WASH. 
MONTHLY (Jan./Feb. 2009) (reviewing ROBERT J. SAMUELSON, THE GREAT INFLATION AND 
ITS AFTERMATH: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN AFFLUENCE (2008)). 
 147 See Samra, supra note 6, at 67 (quoting Friedman).  This Friedman quote comes 
from a chapter in which Friedman once again raises the history of the Weimar 
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Samra fails to analyze the implications of Friedman’s 
monetarist prescription, which would limit the discretion of 
central bankers by tying them to a fixed rule for money, 
essentially requiring that the Federal Reserve limit the growth of 
monetary aggregates to about three percent a year, regardless of 
the consequences.148  According to William Greider, Friedman’s 
solution would have Congress “strip the Fed of its privileged 
independence and enact legislative instructions for U.S. 
monetary policy.”149  Samra is apparently unaware that this 
crude monetarism, based as it is on a quantity theory of money, 
was easily refuted in the early 1980s, when monetarists led by 
Friedman wrongly predicted double-digit inflation would result 
from an increase in the money supply and, instead, inflation 
continued to fall.150  Various explanations—all non-monetary—
were offered by economists, from falling oil prices to a strong 
dollar, and the Federal Reserve itself abandoned the monetarist 
experiment in mid-1982.151 
Friedman’s monetarism is also refuted by the evidence of the 
past two years, during which time central banks around the 
world, and the Federal Reserve in particular, have been trying 
mightily to expand the money supply to ease credit conditions 
and foster economic recovery.152  The result has not been a 
resurgence of inflation.  Quite the contrary, inflation has fallen to 
near zero and the U.S. economy creeps dangerously close to 
deflation.153 
As the Federal Reserve itself recognizes, the velocity of 
money—the frequency in which money is actually spent—can 
 
hyperinflation without providing the important context that Germany was in the grips of 
a balance of payments and foreign debt crisis, and that its central bank was already 
autonomous. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, MONEY MISCHIEF: EPISODES IN MONETARY HISTORY 
194, 217 (1994). 
 148 GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE, supra note 2, at 91–92. 
 149 Id. at 91. 
 150 TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM, supra note 71, at 78–79; Nicholas Kaldor, 
How Monetarism Failed, in HISTORY OF THE U.S. ECONOMY SINCE WORLD WAR II, supra 
note 106, at 423–24; ROBERT LEKACHMAN, GREED IS NOT ENOUGH: REAGONOMICS 120–35 
(1982); Timothy A. Canova, Inflation Hinges Not on M-1 Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1984, 
at A20. 
 151 Andrew E. Busch, Ronald Reagan and the Defeat of the Soviet Empire, 27 
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES Q. 451, 460 (1997) (attributing the decline in inflation to falling oil 
prices engineered by the Saudis as part of a Reagan administration strategy to collapse 
the Soviet economy); Andrew H. Bartels, Volcker’s Revolution at the Fed, in HISTORY OF 
THE U.S. ECONOMY SINCE WORLD WAR II, supra note 106, at 422. 
 152 Johnson, supra note 40. 
 153 David Leonhardt, 2010, a Year of No Inflation, ECONOMIX BLOG, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Sept. 13, 2010 8:45 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/13/2010-a-year-of-
falling-prices. 
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vary quite dramatically.154  This was an insight of Keynes, 
developed in his theory of “liquidity-preference,”155 that 
monetarists like Friedman seem to overlook at critical times.156  
For instance, as consumer and business confidence has declined 
along with the economy during the past two years, there has 
been a marked increase in hoarding by banks, businesses, and 
consumers.157  Under such conditions, expansion of the money 
supply will not necessarily translate into higher inflation or 
higher economic growth.  “The Fed has been pushing reserves 
into the banking system in exchange for toxic assets while hoping 
the banks will lend to consumers and businesses in an 
environment of severe economic insecurity.”158  Marriner Eccles 
himself had criticized this approach as “pushing on a string” and 
largely ineffective.159 
Although the quantity theory of money and other monetarist 
assumptions have been widely discredited, many of the studies 
relied on by Samra remain committed to these doctrines.  In any 
given context, changes in inflation rates may or may not have 
anything to do with central bank structure and monetary policy, 
and they may or may not be related to a host of non-monetary 
factors.  Unfortunately, for autistic economics, context does not 
 
 154 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 1994, supra note 76, at 
27 (reporting that when the velocity of money or credit changes unpredictably, “adherence 
to the initial objectives for money or credit growth would lead to an undesirable outcome 
for output or prices”). 
 155 KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY, supra note 39, at 194–209. 
 156 In fairness, in Friedman’s academic work he recognizes periodic changes in money 
velocity, including periods in which velocity has fallen quite significantly even as the 
supply of money has increased and inflation has remained stable. FRIEDMAN & 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 302, 307 (discussing a sharp decline in money velocity from 
1929–1933); id. at 546 (discussing decline in money velocity during World War II).  But in 
Friedman’s less academic and more popular and polemical writings relied on by Samra, 
there is not a word of mention about the velocity of money. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 
189–95, 202, 205–09, 219–22, 229–33, 235–37, 258–59, 264 (discussing money supply 
growth and inflation without any mention of changes in the velocity of money).  It could 
be construed that the omission was motivated by Friedman’s political agenda and may be 
lacking in intellectual honesty. 
 157 Jia Lynn Yang, Companies Pile Have the Cash But Not the Will to Hire, WASH. 
POST, July 15, 2010, at A1 (reporting that “[n]on-financial companies are sitting on $1.8 
trillion in cash, roughly one-quarter more than at the beginning of the recession”);; Daniel 
Fisher, Excess Reserves Are the $1 Trillion Reminder of Crisis, FORBES BLOG (Aug. 5, 
2010, 9:21 AM), http://blogs.forbes.com/danielfisher/2010/08/05/excess-reserves-are-the-1-
trillion-reminder-of-crisis/ (reporting excess bank reserves at the Federal Reserve rose 
from $1.9 billion in August 2008 to more than $1 trillion two years later). 
 158 Canova, The Federal Reserve We Need, supra note 81. 
 159 MELTZER, supra note 65, at 478 (discussing Eccles’ 1935 testimony to the House 
Committee on Banking and Currency).  Eccles recognized that central bank accom-
modation of large public deficits would prove far more effective than pushing reserves into 
the banking system as long as the federal government spent wisely in putting people back 
to work and investing in the long-term infrastructure needs of the nation. 
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matter, and these studies fail to even consider non-monetary 
factors in changes in inflation rates over time.160 
B. Economic Growth and Income Distribution 
The empirical literature on central bank independence is 
limited and also quite flawed in its treatment of economic growth 
and the distribution of income.  Once again, the studies generally 
narrow the time period of inquiry to reach unsound conclusions.  
Moreover, all the studies relied on by Samra fail to even consider 
the impact of central bank independence on distributions of 
wealth and income. 
For instance, in the study by Carlstrom and Fuerst on the 
New Zealand experience, the authors fail to mention that the 
1950s and 1960s was the longest period of sustained economic 
growth in New Zealand history while inflation averaged about 
four percent.161  Since the Reserve Bank of New Zealand was far 
less independent during this period, it allowed the Labour 
government to pursue Keynesian economics, social welfare, 
employment protection, and the expansion of infrastructure to 
serve economic, employment, and social development 
objectives.162 
This was also the trend in much of the advanced capitalist 
world during the same period, including in the United States, 
Canada, Japan, and much of Western Europe, where politically-
directed central banks were accommodating massive government 
spending and social welfare programs, and high economic growth 
rates.163  Yet, a study by Summers and Alesina found no 
 
 160 See, e.g., Historical U.S. Inflation Rate: 1914 to the Present, supra note 80; 
VATTER, supra note 65, at 100. 
 161 JANE KELSEY, THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIMENT: A WORLD MODEL FOR STRUCTURAL 
ADJUSTMENT? 160 (1997). 
 162 Id. at 23. 
 163 LINDA MCQUAIG, SHOOTING THE HIPPO: DEATH BY DEFICIT AND OTHER CANADIAN 
MYTHS 220–28 (1995) (discussing the role of the Bank of Canada in accommodating public 
spending and investment levels of “the golden era” of the late 1940s to early 1970s which 
“represented a kind of historic compromise between powerful financial interests and the 
working population”);; WILLIAM KREHM, A POWER UNTO ITSELF 26–27 (1993) (describing 
the Bank of Canada’s pegging interest rates at 1.5% throughout the 1940s and 1950s, 
perhaps the most vibrant period in all of Canada’s economic history to accommodate 
active fiscal policies on education, housing, and infrastructure investment); WILLIAM F. 
HIXSON, IT’S YOUR MONEY 124 (1997) (explaining how the Bank of Canada financed the 
public’s purchases of Victory Bonds during World War II “to mobilize the idle real 
resources of the nation—labor, materials, and plant—to win the war”);; Jagdish Bhagwati, 
The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and Dollars, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 
7, 10 (1998) (pointing out that Western Europe and Japan returned to prosperity after 
World War II, and China has enjoyed remarkable economic growth rates in recent years, 
all without capital account convertibility); BLOCK, supra note 75, at 109 (noting that “[a]t 
the beginning of the 1950s . . . no major European currency was convertible”);; MARGARET 
GARRITSEN DE VRIES, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENT, 1945 TO 1986: THE IMF 
Do Not Delete 3/17/2011 12:20 AM 
2011] Black Swans and Black Elephants in Plain Sight 267 
correlation between central bank independence and higher 
economic growth rates precisely because it did not consider any 
data prior to 1955, but mostly focused on the period of 1973–
1988.164  How convenient to mostly ignore the three most 
successful decades for politically directed central banks.  For 
instance, if we compare U.S. economic growth in the 1940s with 
growth in more recent years, the conclusions are much different.  
In fact, U.S. gross national product (GNP) grew at an average 
rate of about 5.2% a year during the 1940s when the Federal 
Reserve was politically-directed,165 compared with average 
annual GNP growth of about 2.4% growth from 1973–1987 when 
the Federal Reserve was far less accountable.166  Therefore, real 
economic growth rates were more than twice as high when the 
central bank was politically accountable compared with when it 
had much greater autonomy. 
According to Mark Weisbrot, real per capital growth in Latin 
America rose 82% between 1960 and 1980, the period prior to 
central bank independence; and only 9% from 1980 to 2000, the 
period coinciding with reforms to independent central banks.167  
This is an enormous decline in growth rates from about 4% a 
year to less than 0.5%, not even high enough to keep pace with 
population increases.  In country after country—Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, Costa Rica—there were enormous 
decelerations in economic activity with the onset of structural 
reforms, including central bank independence, that were imposed 
by the International Monetary Fund in the context of severe 
balance of payments and foreign debt crises.168 
Ha-Joon Chang concludes that the “bad old days” before 
independent central banks was actually the most successful 
period for developing countries, with per capita income growing 
by 3% annually in the 1960s and 1970s, above the 1.7% annual 
growth rates since the 1980s after central bank independence 
 
EXPERIENCE 30–32 (1987) (chronicling reforms in various countries to make their 
currencies legally convertible); BEGG ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y RESEARCH, 
SUSTAINABLE REGIMES OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS IN ACCESSION COUNTRIES viii (indicating 
that some larger Western European countries did not fully remove capital controls until 
the 1990s). 
 164 Samra, supra note 6, at 72 n.56–57; Alesina & Summers, supra note 121, at 160–
61 app. tbls.A1 & A2 (focusing on two periods, 1955–1988 and 1973–1988). 
 165 Statistical Tables Relating to Income, Employment, and Production, in ANNUAL 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS 197, 204 tbl.B-2 (1980), 
available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/erp/issue/1383/download/5809/ 
ERP1980_Appendixes.pdf (providing the basis for the calculation of the 5.2% figure for 
the 1941–1951 period by averaging the annual real GNP growth rates). 
 166 Alesina & Summers, supra note 121, at 161 app. tbl.A2. 
 167 Weisbrot, Latin America’s Electoral Leftward Shift, supra note 99 (providing the 
graphic charts which accompany Weisbrot’s speech). 
 168 Id. 
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and other neoliberal reforms were implemented.169  Chang also 
points out that the average growth rate of developing countries 
since the 1980s “would be even lower if we were to exclude China 
and India,” two countries that have experienced tremendous 
economic growth precisely by not embracing central bank 
independence.170 
China’s central bank is tightly controlled in a one-party state 
and is perhaps the most politically directed central bank in the 
world, with the state dictating the central bank’s objectives and 
policy instruments.171  Yet, China has experienced the fastest 
economic growth over a sustained period of time than any 
country since the United States in the 1940s.172  Meanwhile, 
inflation has not yet gotten out of hand.  For instance, as Chinese 
growth rates have pulled up real estate prices, the authorities 
have imposed margin requirements and other selective credit 
controls to prevent the asset bubble from getting out of hand.173  
China’s central bank has also been directed to intervene in 
foreign exchange markets to keep the Chinese currency 
undervalued to the dollar, thereby helping the country amass 
large trade and current account deficits by promoting 
manufacturing and exports.174  China, India, and Malaysia were 
among the very few Asian countries to avoid economic collapse 
during the Asian currency contagion of the late 1990s by 
 
 169 HA-JOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE SECRET 
HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 27 (2008). 
 170 Id. 
 171 C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD NEEDS 
TO KNOW NOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER 29 (2006); WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE 
WORLD, READY OR NOT: THE MANIC LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 160 (1997). 
 172 G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal 
System Survive?, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 23, 23–24, 26 (2008), available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63042/g-john-ikenberry/the-rise-of-china-and-the-
future-of-the-west. 
 173 Joy C. Shaw, Beijing Acts to Limit Speculative Investing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 
2010, at A15 (reporting an increase in margin requirements and lending rates by State 
Council, China’s cabinet, rather than the People’s Bank of China, the country’s central 
bank).  Hong Kong’s central bank, which is more independent than the People’s Bank of 
China, has been provided with selective credit control instruments and charged with 
containing inflation of asset prices.  Although these intrusions are often considered by 
monetarists to be constraints on central bank prerogatives, such delegated authority has 
provided the central bank with the tools to slow, if not completely prevent, the growth of a 
housing bubble. Jonathan Cheng, Hong Kong Acts to Prevent Bubble, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
24–25, 2009, at B2 (reporting that Hong Kong has managed so far “to sidestep the 
troubles that beset the U.S. subprime mortgage market, thanks to a 30% down-payment 
requirement that has been in place since 1991,” and was recently raised to 40% for the 
high-end property market). 
 174 BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 171, at 90 (concluding that “undervaluation of the 
Chinese currency since 2002 has exacerbated the underlying structural imbalance in 
bilateral trade” and contributed to China’s current account surplus). 
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imposing restrictions on short-term capital flows.175  Recall that 
currency and capital controls are routinely criticized by 
monetarist scholars as intrusions on central bank 
independence.176  Malaysia imposed capital controls over the 
objections of its central bank governor and deputy governor, both 
of whom reportedly resigned in protest.177  As Joseph Stiglitz 
concluded, and the IMF finally conceded:178 “In retrospect, it was 
clear that Malaysia’s capital controls allowed it to recover more 
quickly, with a shallower downturn, and with a far smaller 
legacy of national debt burdening future growth.”179  Meanwhile, 
throughout the period of currency contagion in Asia, India’s 
economy continued to grow at a rate in excess of 5% and China’s 
economy grew at close to 8%.180 
The empirical evidence demonstrates that in both good times 
and bad, economic growth rates are higher when central banks 
are subject to some political control.  China’s emergence as an 
economic powerhouse is particularly instructive: a politically 
directed central bank has accommodated high economic growth 
rates over a sustained period of time while helping to ensure 
relative stability in asset prices and financial markets.  This 
compares favorably with the relative instability and slow growth 
in the United States and other countries with captured central 
banks. 
It is also instructive to consider the relationship between 
economic growth and income distribution.  At times, economic 
growth may be widely shared and contribute to more equitable 
distributions of income; at other times, when based on policies 
that restrict wide distributions, economic growth leads to less 
income equality.181  Slow growth or negative growth is most often 
associated with rising inequality.182  Unfortunately, none of the 
 
 175 STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK, supra note 95, at 34; ROBIN HAHNEL, 
PANIC RULES: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 88 (1999). 
 176 Samra, supra note 6, at 79 (quoting Jácome, Legal Central Bank Independence, 
supra note 58, at 20–22). 
 177 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 124 (2002) [hereinafter 
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS]. 
 178 Michael M. Phillips, IMF Concedes that Malaysia’s Controls over Capital Produced 
Positive Results, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1999, at A21. 
 179 STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, supra note 177, at 125. 
 180 Id. 
 181 James Galbraith describes these negative outcomes as “growth with inequality” 
and “poverty amidst plenty.” Email from James K. Galbraith, Professor, LBJ School of 
Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, to Post-Keynesian list-serve (Aug. 12, 2000, 
10:19), available at http://www.mail-archive.com/pen-l@galaxy.csuchico.edu/ 
msg44810.html (discussing the CEPR paper World Bank Research Faulted). 
 182 The Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social 
Progress has provided a useful critique of the failures of aggregate measurements of GDP, 
income, consumption and wealth to reflect actual living standards and distributions of 
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studies relied on by Samra considered the distributional 
consequences of central bank structure.  In fact, Samra’s ad 
hominem attack was apparently triggered by a quote from my 
own work pointing out that the Washington Consensus policy 
agenda, which includes central bank independence, has coincided 
with a significant redistribution of income and wealth from the 
many at the bottom to the few at the top.183 
Samra’s omission is unfortunate since empirical, theoretical, 
and econometric research does exist which considers the 
relationship between the goal independence of central banks and 
distributional consequences.  For instance, Beyond Inflation 
Targeting provides sophisticated empirical and econometric 
analyses by nearly two dozen economists, none of whom are 
associated with the research departments of central banks or 
other orthodox institutions.184  In particular, the volume 
considers the distributional consequences of “inflation targeting,” 
which, according to Gerald Epstein and Erinç Yeldan, is 
considered “the new orthodoxy” approach, has been adopted by 
some two dozen central banks, and is usually associated with 
central bank independence.185  These and other studies conclude 
that inflation targeting may have significant costs in terms of 
lost output and mal-distributions of income and wealth, including 
differential negative impact on the employment rates of women 
relative to men and on the welfare of workers relative to owners 
and managers.186 
 
income, consumption and wealth. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, AMARTYA SEN & JEAN-PAUL 
FITOUSSI, MISMEASURING OUR LIVES: WHY GDP DOESN’T ADD UP 13–14 (2010). 
 183 Samra, supra note 6, at 74–75 (quoting Canova, Financial Liberalization, supra 
note 28, at 1294). 
 184 BEYOND INFLATION TARGETING: ASSESSING THE IMPACTS AND POLICY 
ALTERNATIVES vii–xi (Gerald A. Epstein & A. Erinç Yeldan eds., 2009). 
 185 Gerald A. Epstein & A. Erinç Yeldan, Beyond Inflation Targeting: Assessing the 
Impacts and Policy Alternatives, in BEYOND INFLATION TARGETING: ASSESSING THE 
IMPACTS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES, supra note 184, at 3–4 (defining the inflation 
targeting policy framework as “‘the public announcement of inflation targets coupled with 
a credible and accountable commitment on the part of government policy authorities to 
the achievement of these targets’”) (quoting Mark Setterfield, Is Inflation Targeting 
Compatible with Post Keynesian Economics?, 28 J. OF POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 653, 653–71 
(2006) and citing to studies by Bernanke, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel). 
 186 Epstein & Yeldan, Beyond Inflation Targeting, supra note 185, at 8; Elissa 
Braunstein & James Heintz, The Gendered Political Economy of Inflation Targeting: 
Assessing Its Impacts on Employment, in BEYOND INFLATION TARGETING, supra note 184, 
at 110–12 (concluding that in middle- and low-income countries dealing with demand-pull 
inflation, inflation targeting may undermine economic growth); Arjun Jayadev, Income, 
Class and Preferences Towards Anti-inflation and Anti-unemployment Policies, in BEYOND 
INFLATION TARGETING, supra note 184, at 87 (finding systematically differential effects on 
the welfare of workers compared with owners, and on different segments of the working 
class).  See also Jose Antonio Cordero, Economic Growth Under Alternative Monetary 
Regimes: Inflation Targeting vs. Real Exchange Rate Targeting, 22 INT’L REV. OF APPLIED 
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In Latin America, the region on which Samra focuses, levels 
of income inequality are among the highest in the world, and the 
levels of poverty have skyrocketed in the present period of 
independent central banks.187 James Galbraith and the 
University of Texas Inequality Project have identified a range of 
policies that undermine growth and equality, namely “policies of 
tearing down social institutions that provide health care, 
education, housing, food and direct support for the wages of low-
income workers,” as well as the deregulation of capital markets 
that lead to inevitable financial crises.188  Unaccountable central 
bankers are more likely to pursue the range of these policies by 
catering to elite financial interests and by limiting the ability of 
elected governments to expand budgets and avoid fiscal 
austerity. 
Unfortunately, questions of growth and distribution are 
hardly asked by Samra and are entirely missing in his four case 
studies.  Among the research he relies upon, the few who discuss 
such issues, like Larry Summers, follow the same flawed 
empirical methodology based on truncated periods of analysis.189  
This outdated orthodox approach, shared by monetarism and 
debased forms of Keynesianism, has simply ignored the 
numerous studies that correlate central bank independence with 
slow growth and rising levels of income inequality.190  The 
orthodoxy ignores distributional questions and entrenches itself 
in abstract ignorance.  This is once again a case of autistic 
economics, oblivious to larger social or historical contexts and 
apparently mesmerized by the elegance of their mathematical 
abstractions. 
 
ECON. 145, 145–60 (2008) (using econometric analysis to conclude that inflation targeting 
undermines growth and employment). 
 187 2009 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 64–65 tbl.2.7 (Data Dev. Grp., The World 
Bank ed., 2009) (reporting high and generally rising poverty rates); id. 72–73 tbl.2.9 
(reporting high Gini coefficients throughout Latin America).  See also James K. Galbraith 
& Hyunsub Kum, Inequality and Economic Growth: Data Comparisons and Econometric 
Tests, (Univ. of Texas Inequality Project, Working Paper No. 21, 2002), available at 
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/papers/utip_21rv.pdf (finding that per capita GDP growth has 
slowed in most countries since 1981 and there is a worldwide trend toward rising 
inequality). 
 188 Galbraith, supra note 181 (discussing the CEPR paper World Bank Research 
Faulted). 
 189 See Alesina & Summers, supra note 121, at 154; Samra, supra note 6, at 72 n.56 
(referencing the research findings of Alesina and Summers). 
 190 The British economist Joan Robinson, part of Keynes’ inner circle, coined the 
phrase “bastard Keynesianism” to describe the early Keynesian models that departed 
from Keynes’ original framework and sought to reconcile Keynesians and non-Keynesians 
by conforming more closely to orthodox theory. SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: THE 
ECONOMIST AS SAVIOR, supra note 44, at 538, 621. 
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C. Agency Capture, Financial Fragility, and Rigged Markets 
There is a tendency among economists to dismiss empirical 
data prior to 1950 as not relevant to today’s realities.  The 1930s 
was a depression decade, the 1940s was a wartime decade, and 
both are seen as anomalies and the data from those periods are 
treated as outliers.191  Perhaps it is understandable that Samra 
would not recognize the salience of the pre-1952 period in U.S. 
monetary history since it is no longer taught in most economics 
departments and business schools.192  But there is certainly no 
reason to ignore the post-2000 period, in which independent 
central banks, led by the Federal Reserve, lowered interest rates 
while relaxing all kinds of meaningful regulatory oversight, 
resulting in an enormous hyperinflation of asset prices followed 
by a bust of historic proportions.  Throughout his brief for central 
bank independence, Samra manages to avoid any mention of the 
financial collapse of 2008 and the enormous ensuing financial 
bailouts, which were engineered by privately-directed central 
banks. 
This blind spot fits within the genre of central bank 
apologists.  They missed the possibility of a black swan prior to 
the financial collapse by ignoring the empirical data of the 
financial collapse of 1929–1933; they now miss the black 
elephant in the closet, the 2008 financial crisis itself and the 
scale of the ongoing bailouts and hidden subsidies.  They also 
overlook how central bank independence has become a cover for 
regulatory capture by private sector banking constituencies.193 
As recognized by Samra, the Federal Reserve has come to 
enjoy complete instrument independence as well as substantial 
goal independence since its mandate as delegated by Congress is 
 
 191 Anti-Keynesians routinely dismiss the high economic growth and low inflation 
rates of World War II by attributing the post-war inflation to the war years. FRIEDMAN & 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 65, at 556–58.  See generally Higgs, supra note 63.  Meltzer himself 
dismissed the 1940s as an anomaly.  MELTZER, supra note 65, at 737–39 (quoting with 
approval Allan Sproul, president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank from 1941 to 
1956).  Niall Ferguson’s myopia suggests that today’s anti-Keynesians have learned 
nothing from the 1940s. Niall Ferguson, Today’s Modern Keynesians Learnt Nothing 
Since the 1930s, FIN. TIMES, July 20, 2010, at 9. 
 192 This observation is based on numerous discussions the author has had over the 
past two decades with faculty in economics departments and business schools around the 
country about the coverage in their basic and advanced courses.  The pre-1952 pegged 
period is missing from mainstream texts used in those courses, and it appears rare for 
faculty to supplement those deficient texts with readings on the pegged period. 
 193 Theories of agency capture easily explain the capture of central banks by their 
commercial banking and financial constituencies. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE 
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); 
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECO. & MGMT. SCI. 3 
(1971); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983). 
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cast in broad terms with conflicting policy objectives.194  But such 
broad delegations of power have only facilitated the Federal 
Reserve’s capture by its big bank constituency.  As Epstein and 
Yeldan acknowledge, “in practice, ‘central bank independence’ 
means that central banks have become less accountable to their 
governments, and, arguably, more accountable to financial elites 
and international organizations such as the IMF.”195 
Central bank independence does not occur in a vacuum; it is 
adopted because of the presence of a strong political 
constituency.196  The Federal Reserve’s most important political 
constituency is comprised of the big banks that own and 
dominate the regional Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal 
Open Market Committee.197  This domination by private bankers 
helps explain the “revolving door” that funnels bank economists 
and lawyers into high level positions at the Federal Reserve and 
routinely rewards Federal Reserve officials with lucrative private 
sector opportunities.198 Although Samra relies on Milton 
Friedman for the quantity theory of money, he ignores 
Friedman’s strident criticism of the Federal Reserve as an agency 
that has been captured by its big bank constituency.199 
Samra quotes approvingly from the Guide to the Perfect 
Latin American Idiot that “the fox in the henhouse is not the 
businessman but the state, which is plucking the chickens 
mercilessly.”200 Hardly any serious observer would accuse 
businesspeople or industrialists, as opposed to bankers and 
 
 194 Samra, supra note 6, at 80 (quoting Walsh, Central Bank Independence, supra 
note 103, at 729); id. at 82 (discussing the Federal Reserve’s complete instrument 
independence and noting that “it has complete discretion over when and to what extent to 
make open market operations and other decisions”). 
 195 EPSTEIN & YELDAN, supra note 184, at 8.  Likewise, Mark Weisbrot notes that the 
CEO of JP Morgan sits on the board of the powerful New York Federal Reserve Bank.  
The problem has been turned on its head as central banks are no longer independent from 
powerful financial interests. Mark Weisbrot, Answer to the People, Not Greedy Elites, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2010, 23.00 GMT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/ 
cifamerica/2010/feb/15/argentina-central-bank-independent. 
 196 Walsh, Central Bank Independence, supra note 103, at 730 (discussing Posen, 
supra note 117). 
 197 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 1994, supra note 76, at 
6–15. 
 198 Milton Friedman, The Case for Overhauling the Federal Reserve, CHALLENGE, 
July–Aug. 1985, at 4, 6 [hereinafter Friedman, Overhauling the Fed] (criticizing the 
Federal Reserve for “churning” its accounts by unnecessary buying and selling of 
government securities to subsidize the bond-dealing operations of its private 
constituency).  See generally Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca, & Christian Fons-Rosen, 
Revolving Door Lobbyists (Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper No 993, 
Aug. 2010), available at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0993.pdf. 
 199 According to Friedman, “no major institution in the United States has so poor a 
record of performance over so long a period of time yet so high a public reputation as the 
Federal Reserve.” Friedman, Overhauling the Fed, supra note 198, at 5. 
 200 Samra, supra note 6, at 75. 
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financiers, of controlling central banks.  In fact, for many years 
critics of independent central banking have proposed including 
representatives of industrial capital on the Federal Reserve’s 
policymaking committees.201  Instead, as the structure of the 
Federal Reserve shows quite clearly, it is private sector 
commercial bankers and financial interests that dominate 
through ownership and direction of the regional Federal Reserve 
Banks.202  The most powerful of the regional Fed banks is the 
New York Federal Reserve Bank, which over the past two years 
has provided some $1.6 trillion in low interest loans, backed by 
shaky collateral, to its member banks, while purchasing some 
$1.25 trillion of their toxic assets and another $500 billion in 
Treasury securities.203  Often referred to as “quantitative easing,” 
the Federal Reserve’s large-scale purchase of assets has a direct 
“qualitative” effect by providing direct financial assistance to the 
private counterparties on these transactions.204  Along with selec-
tive release of insider information by Federal Reserve officials to 
their favored investors (often former Fed officials), these are 
among the many quid pro quos in a system of opaque subsidies 
that are more suggestive of crony capitalism and rigged markets 
than any free and fair playing field.205  It would appear that the 
bankers themselves are playing the role of the fox plucking the 
taxpayer-chickens in the central bank henhouse.206 
In May 2008, former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker 
expressed concern that the Federal Reserve’s independence could 
be undermined by the wide variety of assets it had taken onto its 
balance sheet to help its banking constituency.  He was quoted in 
 
 201 COMMONS, supra note 22, at 900–01; KEYSERLING, supra note 22, at 111. 
 202 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 7–15 (Bd. of Governors 
of the Fed. Reserve Sys. ed., 6th ed. 1974) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: 
PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 1974]. 
 203 FAQs: MBS Purchase Program, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, 
http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/mbs_FAQ.HTML (last updated Aug. 20, 2010) (reporting 
$1.25 trillion in Federal Reserve purchases of mortgage backed securities).  The Federal 
Reserve’s various emergency lending programs exceeded $1.6 trillion. Johnson, supra note 
40 (reporting $112 billion in Primary Credit Program; $493 billion in Term Auction 
Facility; $225.4 billion in section 13(3) lending; $234 billion in Term Securities Lending 
Facility; $147 billion in Primary Dealer Credit; $145 billion in Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility; $349 billion in Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility; and $48 billion in Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility). 
 204 David Wessel, For Fed, Goosing Markets Is a Risk Worth Taking, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
14, 2010, at A4. 
 205 Kristina Cooke et al., Special Report: The Ties that Bind at the Federal Reserve, 
REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68S01020100930. 
 206 In analyzing central bank independence, Samra recognizes that a disproportionate 
focus on formal legal structures “often fails to truly explain the full extent of political 
interference in the central bank decision-making processes.” Samra, supra note 6, at 65.  
Unfortunately, he does not apply such inquiry to the informal (and for that matter, 
formal) mechanisms that allow private financial interests to interfere politically in central 
bank governance. 
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the Wall Street Journal as stating that the central bank might be 
viewed “as the rescuer or supporter of a particular section of the 
market [which] is not strictly a monetary function in the way it’s 
been interpreted in the past.”207  This was nearly six months 
before the New York Federal Reserve Bank, then headed by 
Timothy Geithner, adopted many of the liquidity and open 
market programs that greatly expanded its balance sheet further 
to prop up its constituency.208  Volcker, long respected in finan-
cial circles, suddenly seemed increasingly out of touch with the 
new normal of hidden subsidies for the financial oligarchy of big 
banks and hedge funds. 
B.W. Fraser, former governor of the Australian central bank, 
argues that politicians cannot be trusted to direct monetary 
policy because they are drawn to short-term monetary stimulus 
that will fuel inflation: “Independent and longsighted central 
bankers are needed to rescue politicians from this temptation.”209  
Likewise, Gauti Eggertsson and Eric Le Borgne conclude that 
delegating monetary policy to independent central bankers 
results in “better forecasts and fewer policy mistakes, which 
increases social welfare.”210  Such glorifications of central 
bankers seem naïve at best in light of their role in the financial 
collapse and multi-trillion dollar subsidies to their financial 
constituencies.211  It should now be clear that central bankers are 
not independent from the big banks, and they are as short-
sighted as any banking executive fixated on the next quarterly 
report or daily stock price. 
The Federal Reserve’s capture is also related to the larger 
political culture in Washington.  The politicians who continue to 
delegate broad powers to the Federal Reserve are responding to 
the agenda of the same big banks that exercise decisive influence 
over the central bank.  The lure of large campaign contributions, 
surely a very short-term motive, is often enough to convince 
elected officials to continue with such broad delegations and to 
 
 207 Greg Ip, Fed Balance Sheet Worries Volcker, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2008, at A3. 
 208 DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 256 
(2009). 
 209 Fraser, supra note 35, at 2–3; Samra, supra note 6, at 71 (quoting Fraser). 
 210 Gauti Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank 
Independence 5 (IMF, Working Paper No. 03/144, 2003), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03144.pdf; Samra, supra note 6, at 81 
(quoting Eggerston & Le Borgne). 
 211 Samra offers a “pithy quote” from The Economist that “the only good central bank 
is one that can say no to politicians.” Samra, supra note 6, at 72 n.52.  Since the many 
failures of the world’s leading central banks over the past decade, not least of all by the 
Federal Reserve, perhaps this aphorism should be changed to “the only good central bank 
is one that can say no to its big bank constituencies.” 
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comply with the Wall Street agenda being pushed by the Federal 
Reserve itself.212 
Agency capture helps explain the Federal Reserve’s failure to 
effectively monitor and supervise the lending practices of banks, 
its efforts to undermine the Glass-Steagall firewalls between 
commercial and investment banking, and its lobbying to further 
deregulate markets for financial derivatives.213  Throughout the 
Greenspan and Bernanke eras, at the height of its independence, 
the Federal Reserve has served as the lapdog for Wall Street 
interests rather than as a watchdog to prevent marketplace 
abuses. 
The deregulatory agenda pursued by the Federal Reserve, 
and the financial innovations that resulted, were justified by a 
variety of economic theories, including rational expectations, real 
business cycle theory, and the efficient financial market theory—
all of which were discredited by the present financial crisis, but 
all of which live on by force of momentum and career-long 
commitments in the academy.214  According to numerous eco-
nomic theorists and historians, the consequence of such financial 
innovation is to markedly increase the fragility of the financial 
system.215  A study by Gerald Epstein presents econometric 
evidence correlating independent central banking with more 
speculative financial markets and lower rates of capacity 
utilization.216  The past two decades of independent central 
banking witnessed a proliferation in financial innovations, 
includeing the securitized asset-backed instruments and 
financial derivatives that played an enormous role in the 
financial panic, economic recession, and ongoing crisis. 
D. Case Studies in Historical Context 
The relationship between central bank independence and 
financial fragility is not confined to the United States and other 
wealthy countries.  Samra notes that more than a dozen Latin 
 
 212 “The financial sector is far and away the largest source of campaign contributions 
to federal candidates and parties, with insurance companies, securities and investment 
firms, real estate interests and commercial banks providing the bulk of that money.  The 
sector contributes generous sums to both parties . . . .” Aaron Kiersh, 
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Background, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (last 
updated July 2009), http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/background.php?cycle= 
2010&ind=F. 
 213 Canova, Financial Market Failure, supra note 15, at 384–87. 
 214 ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: THE RETURN OF THE MASTER 32–42 (2009). 
 215 See generally HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (2008); 
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A 
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005). 
 216 Gerald Epstein, Political Economy and Comparative Central Banking, 24 REV. 
RADICAL POL. ECON., no. 1, Spring 1992, at 1–30. 
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American countries have implemented reforms strengthening 
central bank independence in the past three decades.217  He 
selects four of those countries (Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and 
Venezuela) as case studies, none of which seek to correlate 
central bank reforms with changes in any economic indicators.218  
All the case studies show are the legal changes that have 
occurred to make central banks more or less independent.  But a 
closer look at the empirical evidence in these four countries 
suggests the dangers of unaccountable and captured central 
banks. 
As discussed above, in Chile inflation rates rose in the 1980s 
under an independent central bank and fell in the 1990s under a 
regime of capital controls that restricted the central bank’s 
instrument independence and helped shield the country from 
successive currency contagions.219  Although Chile is seen as 
more successful than many other Latin American countries, it 
still suffers from high rates of unemployment and poverty and 
top-heavy distributions of income.220 
In Mexico, the central bank was reformed in 1993;221 in early 
1995 the Mexican peso collapsed.222  Mexico, unlike Chile, 
rejected capital controls.223  The impact of the peso crash and the 
ensuing austerity was severe and added to the mass dislocations 
arising from Mexico liberalizing its agricultural and other 
markets as part of its implementation of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).224  Today, after two decades 
with an independent central bank, Mexico is a failing state, 
fighting a drug war with the burdens of mass unemployment, 
high poverty rates, and huge inequalities in wealth and 
 
 217 Samra, supra note 6, at 66. 
 218 Id. at 66, 82–85, 87, 90. 
 219 See supra notes 206–209 and accompanying text.  See also Gutiérrez, supra note 
110, at 16 tbl.3.; Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 112, at 1621–23, 
1626 (discussing Chile’s encaje program which required foreign investors and lenders to 
deposit thirty percent of the investment or loan into a non-interest bearing account with 
the central bank for a full year or pay a three percent tax to recover the deposit); 
GRANDIN, supra note 112, at 204 (discussing Chile’s break with free market dogma in the 
1980s, turn to state promotion of exports and use of regulatory laws, “including some 
enacted by the vilified Allende government”). 
 220 WORLD BANK, 2009 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 64–65 tbl.2.7 (2009) 
(detailing poverty rates and reporting that one in five Chileans are below the poverty 
line); id. at 72–73 tbl.2.9 (detailing “[d]istribution of income or consumption,” and 
reporting high Gini coefficients for Chile). 
 221 Carstens & Jácome, supra note 82, at 4 n.3. 
 222 Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 112, at 1572. 
 223 Id. at 1625 n.224. 
 224 Id. at 1586–96; Timothy A. Canova, Closing the Border and Opening the Door: 
Mobility, Adjustment, and the Sequencing of Reform, 5 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 341, 344–
46 (2007) [hereinafter Canova, Closing the Border]. 
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income.225  It is difficult to understand how anyone could point to 
Mexico as a success story for independent central banking, trade 
liberalization, privatization, or other components of the 
Washington Consensus policy agenda. 
Argentina’s experience has been equally checkered; central 
bank independence has coincided with years of persistently high 
levels of unemployment, a wave of financial and political 
corruption, an enormous financial crisis in 2001, and the 
country’s worst economic collapse in a century.226  This led to the 
election of a Peronist government that inherited more than 20%, 
60% of the population below the poverty line, and 40% in extreme 
poverty.227  Not surprisingly, the government turned to populist 
measures, including open conflict with the central bank on the 
use of foreign reserves to repay $10 billion to the International 
Monetary Fund in 2009.228  Some months later, when the central 
bank refused to comply with the government’s plan to use 
$6.6 billion of foreign reserves to pay off other debt, President 
Cristina Fernández fired the head of the central bank.229  How 
has all this worked out for Argentina?  A significant economic 
recovery took hold as a result of a devalued peso, renewed 
demand for Argentine agricultural exports, and increased social 
spending by the government.230  According to Mark Weisbrot, it is 
questionable whether Argentina could have begun “the 
remarkable economic recovery that started in 2002, in which the 
economy grew more than 60% in six years, if its central bankers 
had the kind of independence that the U.S. Federal Reserve 
has.”231 
Samra ends his article with a discussion of Venezuela’s 
central bank that serves as an extension of his diatribe against 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez.  Once again, he fails to 
place changes in central bank structure within the context of any 
 
 225 WORLD BANK, supra note 220, at 64–65 tbl.2.7 (detailing poverty rates and 
reporting that one in five Mexicans are below the poverty line and rural poverty is at 
about thirty percent); id. at 72–73 tbl.2.9 (detailing “[d]istribution of income or 
consumption,” and reporting high Gini coefficients for Mexico). 
 226 WILLIAMSON, supra note 122, at 583–84; STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS, supra note 177, at 18, 69; Roberto Frenkel & Martín Rapetti, Five Years of 
Competitive and Stable Real Exchange Rate in Argentina, 2002–07, in BEYOND INFLATION 
TARGETING, supra note 184, at 179–81. 
 227 WILLIAMSON, supra note 122, at 584. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Mark Weisbrot, Answer to the People, Not Greedy Elites: Argentina’s President 
Came Under Fire for Sacking the Head of the Central Bank—But Why Should Such 
Institutions be ‘Independent’?, THE GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (Feb. 15, 2010, 11:00 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/feb/15/argentina-central-bank-
independent [hereinafter Weisbrot, Answer to the People]. 
 230 WILLIAMSON, supra note 122, at 584. 
 231 Weisbrot, Answer to the People, supra note 229. 
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actual economic or financial developments.  As Samra notes, 
Venezuela’s central bank was given administrative autonomy in 
the 1990s.232  He fails to mention that inflation in Venezuela was 
markedly lower in the 1980s than the 1990s, and that inflation 
rose significantly after reform of the central bank in December 
1992.233  Annual inflation averaged about 21% in Venezuela 
throughout the 1980s prior to the central bank reform, 44% from 
1990–1995 as the central bank was being granted more 
autonomy, and 45% from 1996–2000.234  These figures only 
undermine Samra’s thesis that central bank independence is 
correlated with low inflation.235 
Others have criticized Venezuela’s 1992 reform as being 
insufficient: the central bank was legally independent, but it was 
subject to episodes of political interference, including the 
government instituting capital controls, deposit insurance, and 
requiring the central bank to turn over its profits.236  Although 
the central bank was not as independent as Jácome and others 
would have preferred, it was more independent than it would 
become under Hugo Chávez, who is the particular subject of 
Samra’s ire.  Chávez, however, was not elected president until 
December 1998, well after the relatively lower inflation rates of 
the 1980s, prior to central bank independence, and after the 
economic and financial upheavals of the 1990s that occurred 
under an independent central bank.237 
The pre-Chávez history of central bank reform in Venezuela 
suggests that formal legal changes are often less significant than 
underlying political and social realities.  There was impressive 
economic growth in Venezuela in the 1950s to the late 1970s, but 
under the country’s oligarchic two-party system, the gains were 
not widely distributed.238  According to Edwin Williamson, “oil-
wealth became concentrated in the upper echelons, while poverty 
shot up to 50 percent in the 1980s from about 15 percent in the 
 
 232 Samra, supra note 6, at 90. 
 233 Jácome, Legal Central Bank Independence, supra note 58, at 29; id. at 20 
(regarding Dec. 1992 central bank reform); id. at 22 (providing inflation statistics). 
 234 Id. at 20.  See also Gutiérrez, supra note 110, at 16 (reporting annual inflation in 
Venezuela of 13% in 1980–1984, 33% in 1985–1989, 41% in 1990–1994, and 53% in 1995–
1999). 
 235 Recall that Jácome excluded Venezuela and Argentina from his analysis that 
purports to correlate central bank independence with low inflation in the 1990s, perhaps 
because the empirical evidence would only undermine Jácome’s thesis as well. See 
Jácome, Legal Central Bank Independence, supra note 58, at 23–24. 
 236 Id. at 20–22. 
 237 WILLIAMSON, supra note 122, at 594. 
 238 Id. at 593 (reporting that Venezuela’s economy grew about 6% per year from about 
1950 to the late 1970s). 
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1950s.”239  A report of the Inter-American Dialogue that was 
critical of Chávez, conceded that “during the 1980s and 1990s, no 
South American country deteriorated more than Venezuela; its 
gross domestic product (GDP) fell some 40 percent.”240  In 1989, 
after imposing the standard International Monetary Fund 
austerity program, the capital of Caracas exploded in rioting and 
looting which spread to other cities, the army was called in, and 
several hundred civilians were killed in the repression.241  In 
1994, the country’s banking system collapsed and there were 
massive strikes against austerity measures.242 
This all occurred during the period of relative central bank 
independence, but none of this chaos appears in any of the 
autistic economics literature.  It also explains the populism and 
popularity of Chávez when he was elected with 56% of the vote in 
1998.243  As Williamson concluded, “The programme of reform 
undertaken by Chávez has to be understood as a reaction to what 
young army officers like him regarded as a hopelessly corrupt 
oligarchy which had squandered the nation’s huge oil resources 
while doing too little for the poor and disadvantaged.”244 
At the time Chávez assumed power in 1998, Venezuela’s 
poverty rate was 52%;245 by 2007, the poverty rate had fallen to 
27.5%, and there were declines in measures of income inequality 
as well.246  According to Mark Weisbrot, this impressive re-
duction in poverty, which was largely overlooked by the 
mainstream media in the United States, resulted from higher 
economic growth rates and significant government spending to 
increase people’s access to health care, education, and 
nutrition.247 
One need not support Hugo Chávez’s style of politics or his 
foreign policy agenda to see the wisdom in reforming a central 
 
 239 Id. at 594. 
 240 MICHAEL SHIFTER, HUGO CHÁVEZ: A TEST FOR U.S. POLICY, A SPECIAL REPORT OF 
THE INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE 11 (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.thedialogue.org/ 
PublicationFiles/Hugo%20Ch%C3%A1vez%20-%20A%20Test%20for%20U.S.%20Policy% 
20%28pdf%29.pdf. 
 241 WILLAMSON, supra note 122, at 594. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 WORLD BANK, supra note 220, at 65 tbl.2.7. 
 246 Mark Weisbrot, Poverty Reduction in Venezuela: A Reality-Based View, REVISTA: 
HARV. REV. LATIN AM., Fall 2008, at 36, 39 (reporting decline in income inequality in 
Venezuela as measured by the Gini coefficient). 
 247 Id. at 36, 38–39 (reporting that publications such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign 
Policy, the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Financial Times, and the Miami 
Herald and many others had published articles “falsely asserting that poverty had 
increased under the Chavez government”). 
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bank to make it more accountable to a wider range of societal 
interests than those of a narrow banking fraternity.  In 
December 2007, Chávez proposed a series of reforms that 
included restricting the central bank’s independence by vesting 
ultimate monetary authority in the Executive,248 quite different 
from the United States and many other countries where ultimate 
authority is vested in the legislative branch even if the 
legislature has delegated that power to an independent central 
bank for the time being.249  It is also different from the 1940s 
period of central banking in the United States where policy was 
directed by the White House and Treasury which were subject to 
checks and balances by an independent judiciary and legislative 
branch.250  But such distinctions are apparently lost on Samra 
who uses Chávez as a straw man to attack any criticism of 
central bank independence.  The false dichotomy is taken to an 
absurd extreme when Samra raises the specter of Robert Mugabe 
in Zimbabwe.251  Apparently any move toward central bank 
accountability, according to Samra’s logic, is a step toward 
hyperinflation, ruthless dictatorship, and mob violence. 
Perhaps Samra is correct to be concerned about vesting such 
powers in Hugo Chávez, but his misgivings seem to have less to 
do with concerns about the political accountability of the Chávez 
government and much more to do with its social and populist 
objectives.  For instance, Samra criticizes the proposed reform for 
seeking to turn the central bank into an agent for funding “vast 
social programs” and domestic development objectives.252  He 
declares, “A central bank that transforms into a development and 
relief agency has ceased to be a central bank.”253  This, he 
considers, would be “fundamental madness.”254 
Perhaps Samra would dismiss the Federal Reserve’s strict 
accountability during the 1940s as nothing more than “a slush 
fund” for Franklin Roosevelt’s “regional, political, and military 
ambitions, not to mention his domestic development goals.”255  
 
 248 Chris Kraul, Venezuelan Voters Reject Bid by Chavez to Extend Powers, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, at A1. 
 249 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 1947, supra note 2, 
at 1. 
 250 Id. at 101–04.  For instance, Samra criticizes the proposed 2007 reform for 
attempting to require the Venezuelan central bank to follow the policy direction of the 
elected government, not unlike in the 1940s when the Federal Reserve followed the lead 
of the White House and Treasury. Samra, supra note 6, at 92–94. 
 251 Samra, supra note 6, at 65 (quoting Felipe Larrain’s warnings about 
hyperinflation being awakened by leaders such as Chavez and Mugabe). 
 252 Id. at 94. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. 
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But for the millions of people in the United States and abroad 
who sought freedom and security, those ambitions and goals were 
theirs as well.  Should we consider it “madness” to have a central 
bank support programs like the G.I. Bill of Rights, the Marshall 
Plan, or childhood education and nutrition, but somehow 
consider it acceptable when a central bank provides trillions of 
dollars in support for commercial banks and hedge funds?  Such 
a perspective may seem upside-down to all but well-heeled 
lawyers and economists representing large banks and other 
financial interests.  The reality is that since the 2008 financial 
crisis, the Federal Reserve has transformed itself into a relief 
agency for powerful banks and wealthy investors.  This should 
suggest that the central bank has ceased to be a central bank for 
anyone but an elite financial oligarchy.  Therein lies the fun-
damental madness of our current troubles. 
E. Farewell to Legal Autism 
All four of the case studies offered by Samra are examples of 
“legal autism”—descriptions of legal rules without any reference 
to social settings or historical contexts, and without any 
correlation to changes in actual economic performance.256  It is a 
strange ending to an argument that relies elsewhere on empirical 
evidence of a purported relationship between central bank 
independence and low inflation.  Although Samra makes the bold 
assertion that the results of these studies are “quite striking” and 
“clearly argue in favor of greater independence,” they are mainly 
striking in their flaws.257  In fact, in reading these studies one 
would have no idea that there had been tremendous economic 
growth and low inflation from the 1940s through the 1960s in 
much of the world in the absence of independent central 
banking;258 that a global oil cartel had quadrupled the price of oil 
in the early 1970s, and then doubled the price at the end of that 
decade;259 that there had been debt crises and currency 
contagions throughout Latin America and much of the developing 
world over the past three decades;260 that China has risen as an 
economic power without the help of an independent central 
 
 256 Id. at 82–93 
 257 Id. at 73. 
 258 CHANG, supra note 169, at 27–31; HAHNEL, supra note 175, at 7; BRETTON WOODS 
COMM’N, BRETTON WOODS: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, COMMISSION REPORT (1994); 
Average Annual Inflation Rates by Decade, INFLATIONDATA.COM (2008), 
http://www.inflationdata.com/inflation/images/charts/articles/decadeinflation.jpg. 
 259 Andrew Brod, Look Back at 1970s to Understand a Real Energy Crisis, NEWS-
RECORD.COM, http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/A_Brod_LookBackat1970_2001.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2011). 
 260 Kristin J. Forbes & Roberto Rigobon, Contagion in Latin America: Definitions, 
Measurement, and Policy Implications, ECONOMIA, Spring 2001, at 1, 1–2. 
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bank;261 and that 2008 brought a tremendous crisis in global 
financial markets and the most severe economic downturn in 
many countries since the Great Depression.262 
These are rather astounding omissions.  At a time when 
mainstream economics has been criticized and discredited for 
failing to predict or prevent the tremendous hyperinflation of 
asset prices and the most damaging financial crisis in more than 
eighty years, apologists of central bank independence continue to 
overlook any empirical evidence and historical facts that would 
undermine their normative conclusions.  Since the crash, the 
Federal Reserve has poured trillions of dollars into its private 
sector banking clientele; a colossal monetary version of pork-
barrel spending.263  None of this is even mentioned by Samra.  It 
is an impressive display of myopia and studied ignorance.  There 
is no justification offered for the limited scope of analysis and no 
recognition that perhaps the very broad conclusions of these 
studies should therefore be tempered. 
III.  THE SEARCH FOR MEANINGFUL DEBATE 
The regime of independent central banking has contributed 
significantly to a financial and economic crisis of historic 
proportions.  Its supporters, however, have shown little to no 
responsibility for their actions.  In fact, the independence of the 
leading central banks, particularly the Federal Reserve and the 
European Central Bank, have been instrumental in fashioning 
the hidden bailouts that continue to subsidize the profits and 
bonuses of big banks and hedge funds.264  The obvious culpability 
of central bankers warrants some degree of humility and 
introspection by supporters of central bank independence. 
It is a sign of the weakness of the case for central bank 
autonomy that some of its proponents would choose to engage in 
“ad hominem” attacks on those who support increased 
accountability.265  Samra’s article engages in an unfortunate level 
 
 261 See generally ZULIU HU & MOHSIN S. KHAN, WHY IS CHINA GROWING SO FAST?, 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 8 (1997). 
 262 Heather Stewart, We Are in the Worst Financial Crisis Since Depression, Says 
IMF, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 10, 2008, at A28. 
 263 James Quinn, Audit of Fed Will Reveal Name of Banks Given $2 Trillion in Loans, 
THE TELEGRAPH (May 12, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ 
newsbysector/banksandfinance/7713041/Audit-of-federal-reserve-will-reveal-name-of-
banks-given-2-trillion-in-loans.html. 
 264 Jack Ewing & Julia Werdigier, Europe’s Central Bank Extends Cash Lifeline and 
Gives Regulators a Pep Talk, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, at B3 (reporting European 
Central Bank purchases of 40.5 billion euros ($49.1 billion) in bonds on the open market 
while failing to disclose what kinds of bonds). 
 265 An ad hominem argument seeks to link the validity of a premise to a 
characteristic of the person advocating the premise by appealing to feelings or prejudices 
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of ad hominem argumentation directly in response to my critique 
of central bank autonomy and my view that the Washington 
Consensus policy agenda was resulting in widening inequalities 
in income, wealth, and power that were empirically 
measureable.266  Those inequalities have become too large to 
ignore, which is why ad hominem arguments, by attacking the 
messenger, are intended on some level to discredit the messenger 
and shock the discussion back in another direction, deflecting 
discussion away from social inequality and structural injustices. 
Nowhere does Samra actually refute the empirical evidence 
that the trend toward central bank independence has coincided 
with stagnant real wages, higher real interest rates, and 
increasing inequalities in income, wealth, and power.  Instead, 
Samra engages in a fair amount of breathless name-calling while 
conflating my argument with the views of Latin American 
populists and dictators, past and present.  He does this through 
the use of the ad hominem “perfect idiot” which he claims is the 
insight of a “groundbreaking study of Latin American populism” 
entitled Guide to the Perfect Latin American Idiot, itself one long 
ad hominem attack of name-calling and guilt-by-association 
against anyone who has ever offered a critical history of Latin 
America or U.S. foreign policy or called for redressing the 
enormous inequalities in income, wealth, and power through the 
agencies of the state.267 
Although the co-authors of The Perfect Idiot, like Samra, 
never define their terms, it is instructive to do so.  “Idiot” is 
considered “usually offensive” and is used to describe “a person 
affected with extreme mental retardation,” “a foolish or stupid 
person,” and is derived from the Greek idiōtēs to mean a 
“layman” or “ignorant person.”268  The use of this insult by Samra 
and The Perfect Idiot authors, after having ignored all contrary 
factual evidence (all the black swans and all the black elephants 
 
rather than intellect;; it is marked by “an attack on an opponent's character rather than by 
an answer to the contentions made.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 15 
(11th ed. 2004).  In this case, the premise is that independent central banks undermine 
social welfare.  Samra’s ad hominem attacks seek to undermine that premise by name-
calling and guilt-by-association tactics. 
 266 Samra, supra note 6, at 74–75 (quoting from Canova, Financial Liberalization, 
supra note 28, at 1294, 1301–04).  Samra’s article is filled with breathless exclamations of 
“terrifying” and “ominous warnings” of hyperinflation and ruthless dictatorships that are 
to be associated with making central banks more accountable to elected governments. 
Samra, supra note 6, at 65.  Perhaps in the future he will develop the “mental courage” to 
re-think his mode of arguments, underlying assumptions and world view. David Brooks, A 
Case of Mental Courage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2010, at A23 (decrying the underlying 
“metacognition deficit” that habitually afflicts this generation and prevents people from 
stepping back to re-think their positions and weaknesses). 
 267 Id. at 75. 
 268 MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 265 (emphasis added). 
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in plain sight), is a bit like the pot calling the kettle black.  
Perhaps “glutton” would be an equally apt term to describe the 
mind-set of the authors of The Perfect Idiot.269  The vast and 
growing inequalities in wealth and income, along with enormous 
central bank subsidies to a financial oligarchy, are suggestive of 
an upper-class elite that is prone to gluttony.  Perhaps “the 
perfect glutton” is one who will swallow any shallow or specious 
argument, including ignorant empirical studies, all in the 
interests of amassing more riches beyond that which can ever be 
consumed in a lifetime.  But it is a gluttony that is concealed in 
high-minded pretensions to cosmopolitanism and economic 
sophistication. 
Guide to the Perfect Latin American Idiot is a book written 
by three ideological right-wing Latin American journalists, a 
book with no index, no sources, and a lot of name-calling.270  It is 
not the work of scholarship and it does not belong in a serious 
scholarly article on central bank accountability.  Its misuse by 
Samra is worthy of a response, but before discussing the parts of 
this book misused by Samra, it is instructive to consider the 
general tenor of the book and its ideological biases.  Although 
The Perfect Idiot co-authors seek to place their work within the 
tradition of satire, it is difficult to imagine Sartre,271 Camus,272 or 
Revel273 flinging ad hominem insults at their adversaries and 
then pretending it is to seek “intellectual confrontation in the 
arena of ideas, not anecdotes, using arguments, not insults or 
personal attacks.”274  If calling one’s adversaries names like 
“idiots” is not an insult, then the level of discourse has surely 
fallen to a new low.  If it is genuinely an attempt at satire, then 
for all three The Perfect Idiot co-authors their laugh is truly 
louder than their humor.275 
 
 269 Glutton is defined as “one given habitually to greedy and voracious eating and 
drinking,” one possessing a voracious appetite that endures and is never satiated. Id.  Its 
synonyms include gorger, hog, overeater, pig, and stuffer.  The word is derived from the 
Latin gluttire, “to swallow.” Glutton, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/glutton (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). 
 270 Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza is a Columbian novelist; Carlos Alberto Montaner is a 
Cuban essayist and journalist; Alvaro Vargas Llosa is a Peruvian columnist. MENDOZA, 
MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 219. 
 271 See generally JEAN PAUL SARTRE, http://www.sartre.org (last visited Jan. 11, 
2011). 
 272 See generally The Nobel Prize in Literature 1957 Albert Camus, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, 
(Jan. 11, 2011), http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1957/camus-
bio.html. 
 273 See generally Jean-Francois Revel, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (Jan. 11, 2011), 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1221191/Jean-Francois-Revel. 
 274 Mario Vargas Llosa, Introduction to MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, 
supra note 19, at xvi. 
 275 The Perfect Idiot book lacks empirical support and rigor; there is no serious index 
or list of references, and no attempt to discuss ideas without name-calling.  There is a 
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The book begins with an attack on Eduardo Galeano’s truly 
groundbreaking 1970 book, Open Veins of Latin America which 
The Perfect Idiot trio crudely denounces as the idiot’s Bible.276  
They attack Galeano, just as Samra attacks my work, for use of 
“the old dichotomy” of left versus right, the use of the word 
“neoliberal” to describe the Washington Consensus agenda, and 
the use of class to analyze the effects of that policy agenda on 
Latin American societies.277  According to Michael Davis and 
Dana Neacsu, “one of the hegemonic and legitimizing features of 
globalization is the exclusion of parts of the debate as unworthy, 
in fact foreclosing what might be the most meaningful parts of 
the debate as meaningless.”278  Apparently, The Perfect Idiot trio 
would foreclose any class analysis as meaningless and any 
discussion of political polarization and a neoliberal agenda as old 
thinking.  Perhaps in 1996, in the “irrational exuberance” of the 
expanding bubble economy, when The Perfect Idiot was first 
published, it may have seemed that such discussions could be 
excluded as unworthy and meaningless.  In the aftermath of the 
bubble, as it continues to deflate for millions around the world, 
class analysis and critiques of the neoliberal agenda and 
criticism of unaccountable central bankers may well be the most 
meaningful parts of debate. 
The Perfect Idiot trio attack Galeano for his use of the “open 
veins” metaphor and his view that the underdevelopment of poor 
countries is historically the result of the enrichment of others.279  
They take exception with Galeano’s statement that “Everything, 
from the discovery until our times, has always been transmuted 
into European—or later United States—capital, and as such has 
accumulated in distant centers of power.”280  Perhaps the trio 
 
compendium of quotations entitled “Index Expurgatorius Latinoamericanus” which 
denigrates a list of people and organizations that includes Raul Alfonsin (the former 
president of Argentina who helped defeat a military dictatorship), Amnesty International 
(for its conclusion that market reforms “have exacerbated social tensions” in Colombia), 
and Brazilian president Lula Da Silva (for a statement against privatizing state-owned 
companies and asserting the state has an important and dominant role). Id. at 209–18.  
Just to make sure all of these speakers are discredited by association, this “Index 
Expurgatorius Latinoamericanus” also includes Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, and it 
begins with an unattributed quotation: “It isn’t having been an idiot that’s so bad but 
persisting to be one.” Id. 
 276 Id. at 21.  See generally EDUARDO GALEANO, OPEN VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA: FIVE 
CENTURIES OF THE PILLAGE OF A CONTINENT (1973). 
 277 MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 66–69; Samra, supra 
note 6, at 74–75. 
 278 Michael Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of Free 
Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing Principles of Political Economy, 69 
UMKC L. REV. 733, 734 (2001). 
 279 MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 25 (quoting GALEANO, 
supra note 276, at 11). 
 280 GALEANO, supra note 276, at 12. 
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should consider the views of Adam Smith, the grandfather of 
free-market economics whom they would likely claim as their 
ideological ancestor and soul mate.  Smith wrote of the 
consequences of the Old World “discovery” of Latin America: “The 
pious purpose of [Spain] converting them to Christianity 
sanctified the injustice of the project.  But the hope of finding 
treasures of gold there was the sole motive which prompted 
[Spain] to undertake it.”281  The vast riches of gold and silver 
taken by Spain from the New World were “of a nature to excite in 
human avidity the most extravagant expectation of still greater 
riches.”282 
The Perfect Idiot trio scorn all non-monetarist views of 
inflation, which, as discussed above, only serves to show their 
own ignorance.283  Likewise, they ridicule the idea of declining 
terms of trade and structural inequalities in political and market 
power, and instead hold fast to simplistic assumptions of arms-
length bargaining between equals.284  They ignore serious 
critiques of the global trading system offered by leading Latin 
American economists and they distort the history of the foreign 
debt crisis by characterizing bank loans of petrodollars at high 
interest rates as gifts.285  They denigrate the idea that division of 
labor and trade results in winners and losers, an axiom of free 
trade theory and empirical reality itself.286  But for all their 
ridicule and ignorance, there is not any serious analysis, only 
conclusory arguments that show serious ideological biases. 
For instance, their ideological blinders are apparent in their 
discussion of Chile, where they claimed the vast majority of 
citizens support the creation of a private pension and health care 
system.  “Only a perfect idiot,” they claim, “would think of 
 
 281 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 72 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976). 
 282 Id. at 78. 
 283 MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 24–44. 
 284 Id. at 44 (equating criticisms of declining terms of trade with complaints about 
natural injustices such as the color of the sky). 
 285 Id. at 54. 
 286 Id. at 23.  See also Eli Heckscher, The Effect of Foreign Trade on the Distribution 
of Income, in READINGS IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 272, 272 (Howard S. 
Ellis & Lloyd A. Metzler eds., 1949) (introducing the Heckscher-Ohlin model); PAUL R. 
KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 72 
(2006); MICHAEL P. TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 378–83 (3d 
ed. 1985) (discussing Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin trade theories in context of growth 
in less developed countries); STEVEN M. SURANOVIC, INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND 
POLICY 134 (2010) (discussing distributive effects of trade and the compensation principle 
by which winners of free trade should compensate lowers to benefit of all); JOHN 
WILLIAMSON, THE OPEN ECONOMY AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 42–43 (1983) (discussing 
comparative advantage and the Heckscher-Ohlin model); Elizabeth Becker, U.N. Study 
Finds Global Trade Benefits Are Uneven, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at C5. 
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returning to a government-run pension system” that would 
consume money, expand the bureaucracy, and create a jungle of 
middlemen to administer such a program.287  Instead, there has 
been a jungle of private insurance company middle men, a huge 
private bureaucracy siphoning the savings of millions in the form 
of hefty commissions and administrative fees, not unlike the 
private health insurance bureaucracy found in the United States.  
In a 2004 World Bank study, empirical analysis of two decades of 
Chile’s pension system showed that “more than half of all 
workers [are excluded] from even a semblance of a safety net 
during their old age.”288  Investment accounts of retirees were so 
low that forty-one percent of those eligible to receive pensions 
were forced to continue working and the government was forced 
to provide subsidies for those failing to accumulate enough 
money in their pension accounts to pay basic old age expenses in 
retirement.289 When the huge commissions and other 
administrative costs were taken into consideration, the total 
average return on worker contributions between 1982 and 1999 
was 5.1%, less than half of what had been calculated by the 
superintendency of pension funds.290  The average worker would 
have done better by simply placing their pension contributions in 
a passbook savings account.291 
Chile’s privatized pension scheme was good business for 
private investment firms but it failed to provide for many 
retirees, thereby contributing to Chile’s high poverty rate.  
Retirees would have received higher annuities “if the system had 
remained in government hands.”292  Recall The Perfect Idiot trio’s 
conclusion that “only a perfect idiot would think of returning to a 
government-run pension system.”293  In fact, Chileans were 
forced to re-think the country’s privatized pension system and to 
cough up government subsidies to supplement the program.294 
 
 287 MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 72. 
 288 GREG ANRIG, THE CONSERVATIVES HAVE NO CLOTHES: WHY RIGHT-WING IDEAS 
KEEP FAILING 206 (2004) (quoting a 2004 World Bank report).  See INDERMIT S. GILL, 
TRUMAN G. PACKARD & JUAN YERMO, KEEPING THE PROMISE OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN 
LATIN AMERICA xvii (2004). 
 289 Greg Anrig & Bernard Wasow, Twelve Reasons Why Privatizing Social Security is 
a Bad Idea, THE CENTURY FOUNDATION (Dec. 13, 2004), http://tcf.org/publications/2004/ 
12/pb503. 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. 
 292 GRANDIN, supra note 112, at 203 (citing to Larry Rohter, Chile’s Retirees Find 
Shortfall in Private Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at A1). 
 293 MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 72. 
 294 Larry Rohter, Chile’s Candidates Agree to Agree on Pension Woes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 10, 2006, at A3 (quoting Patricio Navia, a political science professor, that most 
Chileans “perceive the costs of pensions and the pensions themselves as unfair” and as 
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In the 2006 presidential election, Sebastián Piñera, the 
billionaire businessman and conservative candidate, agreed that 
the privatized pension system was in need of repair.295  He noted 
that half of Chileans had no pension coverage and of those who 
did, 40% were not receiving the minimum level.296  This was a 
rather embarrassing admission since the candidate’s brother, 
José Piñera, was “the former labor minister who imposed the 
personal account system” during the Pinochet dictatorship and 
since Sebastián Piñera was “backed by the large business groups 
that control the pension funds and have benefited from the 
expansion of investment capital the funds have provided.”297 
How ironic for the conservative candidate, and brother of the 
architect of pension privatization, to propose a government 
“guaranteed pension for housewives,” “matching government 
contributions” for the poor, and “more bargaining power for 
consumers.”298  The only idiocy is that anyone would be surprised 
that a privatized pension system could possibly result in huge 
profits for private pension fund managers and inadequate 
returns for most Chileans.  But it is important to recall that the 
private pension scheme was put in place during a period of 
military dictatorship when labor unions and civil society lacked 
basic democratic freedoms, large business interests enjoyed 
favored access to government, and the polity was essentially 
shocked, murdered, and tortured into submission. 
Throughout their book, The Perfect Idiot co-authors are the 
perfect apologists for violent dictatorships and coup d’états 
against elected governments and civil society, including any coup 
sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or big 
business interests.  For a book that purports to disdain the 
political divisions between left and right, the trio is silent on  
the crimes of the right.  They attack Augusto Sandino, the 
Nicaraguan revolutionary who rebelled against U.S. occupation 
of his country,299 but not a word of condemnation for Anastasio 
 
resenting the huge overhead costs “that have led to record profits for the pension funds 
that manage the contributions”). 
 295 Id. 
 296 Id. 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id.  Apparently, proposing government guaranteed pensions and other such public 
interventions was not bad politics.  Although he lost his campaign in 2006, Sebastián 
Piñera was ultimately elected president of Chile in January 2010. Times Topics: 
Sebastián Piñera, NYTIMES.COM, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/ 
people/p/sebastian_pinera/index.html (last updated Oct. 13, 2010) (reporting that in his 
2010 campaign, Mr. Piñera “promised to carry on many of the social programs put in 
place by President Michelle Bachelet, whose approval ratings have hovered around 75 
percent”). 
 299 MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 152. 
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Samoza, the brutal Nicaraguan dictator who served U.S. 
geopolitical and corporate interests.300  They condemn Jacobo 
Árbenz Guzmán, the reformist and duly-elected president of 
Guatemala who was overthrown in a CIA-financed coup in 1954 
to shield the United Fruit Company from any land reform.301  
They vilify Salvador Allende, the democratically-elected 
president of Chile violently overthrown on September 11, 1973, 
in another CIA-sponsored and corporate-financed coup that 
installed Augusto Pinochet in a brutal dictatorship.302  They 
scorn Cuba’s Marxist dictator Fidel Castro but go easy on what 
came before Castro, the corrupt and repressive regime of 
Fulgencio Batista, who was in bed with organized crime.303 
Such partisanship is shameful for journalists as well as 
would-be scholars.  Camus reminded the writers of his day to 
aspire to bear witness for those who are enslaved and he rejected 
apologists for repression who were angered at the murder of a 
man only when that man shared their ideas.304  Camus 
understood that the brutal repressions in the East bloc did not 
excuse the sins of the West. 
Not only is the trio’s disdain for democracy and human 
rights morally reprehensible, it is also self-defeating to long-term 
interests of peace and stability.  As Edwin Williamson concluded, 
“It was the toppling of Árbenz that had alienated young radicals 
throughout Latin America, persuading them of the need for 
armed struggle.”305  The record of past U.S. support for 
repression and brutality in Latin America lives on in our present 
 
 300 See generally WILLIAM KREHM, DEMOCRACIES AND TYRANNIES OF THE CARIBBEAN 
(1984) [hereinafter KREHM, DEMOCRACIES AND TYRANNIES]. 
 301 WILLIAMSON, supra note 122, at 323, 353 (discussing involvement of CIA and 
United Fruit).  See generally DEMOCRACIES AND TYRANNIES, supra note 300.  The Perfect 
Idiot trio claim that the 1954 CIA coup against President Árbenz in Guatemala was not to 
help United Fruit but was inspired by Árbenz’ purchase of Czech weapons and his 
purported strong ties to communism. MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 
19, at 139.  They offer no real support for such conclusions and their guilt-by-association 
indictment of Árbenz is reminiscent of the Red Scare of the McCarthy period at the time 
of the coup. 
 302 MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 209, 352; WILLIAMSON, 
supra note 122, at 67.  See also NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF 
DISASTER CAPITALISM 99–100 (2007); PETER KORNBLUH, THE PINOCHET FILE: A 
DECLASSIFIED DOSSIER ON ATROCITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 105 (2003). 
 303 MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 209, 181; WILLIAMSON, 
supra note 122, at 443–44. 
 304 ALBERT CAMUS, Why Spain?, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 75, 83 
(Justin O’Brien trans., 1960) (replying to a December 1948 publication by Gabriel Marcel 
in COMBAT). 
 305 WILLIAMSON, supra note 122, at 588 (reporting that the CIA’s overthrow of Árbenz 
“was the decisive factor in Che Guevara’s decision to join Fidel Castro’s insurgency in 
Cuba in 1956”). 
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day, giving credence to conspiracy theories306 and complicating 
U.S. efforts to build strong alliances in the region.307 
But perhaps peace and stability, like democracy and human 
rights, are not the real objectives of many of those who defend 
the prerogatives of central bankers.  In The Shock Doctrine, 
Naomi Klein exposed the right-wing strategy to consciously 
exploit crises to push through market reforms—“shock 
therapy”—that would never happen in less frightening times.308  
The crises could be actual or perceived, unexpected or 
intentional, from a natural disaster to a violent coup d’état.309 
The mode of argument deployed in The Perfect Idiot also 
lives on and seems to be gaining strength in our political and 
popular and academic cultures.  Ad hominem attacks have 
become standard fare in our public debates.  Like The Perfect 
Idiot trio who vilify anyone who speaks up for social rights and 
economic justice, Glenn Beck, the right-wing Fox-TV talk show 
host, has equated Christian churches working for “social justice” 
with Nazism and Communism.310  Samra and The Perfect Idiot 
trio invoke Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro time and again to 
smear scholars and substantive arguments completely 
unconnected to Chávez or Castro.  Likewise, Sarah Palin, the 
former vice presidential candidate, has used the same McCarthy-
era style guilt-by-association tactics to attack the recent U.S. 
health care reform by invoking Fidel Castro, as if the fact that 
 
 306 Chavez Accuses CIA as Bombings Rock Venezuela, TAIPEI TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at 7, 
available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2003/10/08/2003070877. 
 307 For instance, revelations that General Pinochet amassed a fortune of $28 million 
while in power, perhaps in part from manufacturing and smuggling cocaine, undermines 
U.S. efforts to build alliances in the region.  Larry Rohter, Former Aide Says Pinochet and 
a Son Dealt in Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2006, at A3.  The person who defeated 
Sebastián Piñero in Chile’s 2005 presidential election was Michelle Bachelet, “a member 
of Allende’s Socialist Party who had been exiled for a time in East Germany.” 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 122, at 579. 
 308 KLEIN, supra note 302, at 7–8, 11–13. 
 309 Id. at 174–75, 230–31, 290–91, 320 (showing various examples of how certain 
crises have elicited the same policy responses as characterized by “shock therapy”).  Of 
course, crisis has also had the effect of moving policy to the left;; Roosevelt’s New Deal was 
made possible by the massive hardships and dislocations of the Great Depression.  
However, right-wing governments seem more adept at creating and engineering crises, 
when not through violent coups then by gross mismanagement and looting of the 
economy. J. Lawrence Broz, Partisan Financial Cycles (draft dated April 18, 2010), 
available at http://cpe.ucsd.edu/assets/006/11488.pdf (finding “that governments in power 
prior to major financial crises are more likely than the average OECD country to be right-
of-center in political orientation” and “more likely to be associated with policies that 
predict crises: large fiscal and current account deficits, heavy borrowing from abroad, and 
lax bank regulation”). 
 310 Hanna Siegel, Christians Rip Glenn Beck over ‘Social Justice’ Slam: Right-Wing 
Host Conflates Christian ‘Social Justice’ With Nazism, Communism, ABC NEWS (Mar. 12, 
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/glenn-beck-social-justice-christians-rage-back-nazism/ 
story?id=10085008. 
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Castro once said something positive about the reform has any 
bearing on its substantive merits or flaws.311  These kinds of 
mindless hit-and-run attacks are lamentable in political 
discourse, and more so in scholarly discussion. 
As for Samra’s use of The Perfect Idiot in his defense of 
central bank independence, he attacks class-based critiques of 
the Washington Consensus model as ubiquitous, the “old 
dichotomy of the left against the right,” semantic, emotional, 
frenzied, repetitive, Marxist Vulgate, and likened them to the 
Inquisition against Middle Age heresies.312  That is an awful lot 
of name-calling to avoid a response on the substantive merits as 
to whether or not the Washington Consensus policy agenda is 
actually correlated to top heavy distributions of wealth and 
income, increased poverty levels, and diminished security.  As 
discussed above, all of these distributional consequences are 
empirically verifiable, and it is precisely because these 
consequences have in fact been empirically verified313 that Samra 
must engage in this distasteful name-calling. 
Samra also apparently considers the use of the word 
“neoliberalism” to be an appeal to populist prejudices, an 
anathema that radical leftists attempt to lodge into the public 
conscience.314  As a former legislative aide to the late U.S. 
Senator Paul Tsongas who was a leader in what was often 
referred to in the 1980s as a neoliberal movement within the 
Democratic Party,315 I have witnessed the evolution of the term 
“neoliberal” from Tsongas’s moderate liberalism to a more 
aggressive libertarian economic agenda that seeks a fantasy 
state in economic relations (“there’s no government like no 
government”) where owners of capital enjoy a world of rights 
without duties.316  If repeating the “neoliberalism” word has some 
mesmerizing effect on the public conscience, perhaps all the more 
 
 311 Michael Muskal, Ex-running Mates Reunite, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2010, at A18 
(reporting Sarah Palin’s statement that “When it comes to Obamacare[,] . . . I see Fidel 
Castro likes Obamacare and we don’t.  Doesn’t that tell you something?”). 
 312 Samra, supra note 6, at 75.  Perhaps Samra should also consult with The 
Federalist Papers which recognized the existence of social and class divisions, including 
along the line of creditor and debtor factions. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 54–55 (James 
Madison) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 313 See supra notes 264–267, 312 and accompanying text. 
 314 Samra, supra note 6, at 75. 
 315 Even in the hands of Senator Tsongas, who held many traditional liberal values 
and supported many social welfare programs, the short-lived “Neoliberal” movement 
showed a disturbing indulgence for economic orthodoxy and financial deregulation. PAUL 
TSONGAS, THE ROAD FROM HERE: LIBERALISM AND REALITIES IN THE 1980S, at xii–xv 
(1981). 
 316 See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 66, 69 (2005). 
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reason to invoke it.317  At any rate, in more recent years, 
“neoliberalism” seems to have been replaced with the terms 
“Washington Consensus” and “market fundamentalism.”  All 
three of these terms are basically efficient short-hand for the 
same policy agenda that has been promoted by the International 
Monetary Fund, the U.S. Treasury, Wall Street interests, and 
other leading G-8 institutions: deregulation, trade liberalization, 
financial liberalization, privatization, fiscal austerity, and central 
bank independence.318 
Is it politically incorrect to use words and phrases such as 
“neoliberalism,” “Washington Consensus,” and “market 
fundamentalism;” and how about the word “autism” to describe 
the abstract unreality of mainstream economics?  Perhaps these 
too will be dismissed by Samra as the idiot’s attempts to rouse 
the rabble through frenzied repetition.  Samra’s diatribe against 
terminology seems eerily reminiscent of right-wing thought 
police and left-wing guardians of political correctness.319  The 
point of such name-calling, however, is to prevent any 
substantive discussion from moving forward about poverty rates, 
social insecurity, and distributions of wealth and income. 
Samra continues his ad hominem attack by quoting from The 
Perfect Idiot trio that anyone is an idiot who believes that 
monetary issuance as a way of reactivating demand and making 
up for the shortage of resources “is also a means not only of 
development but of what he defines, with grandiloquent 
pomposity, as social investment.”320  Apparently, Samra would 
consider Abraham Lincoln to have been an idiot for signing the 
Legal Tender Acts that created nearly $450 million of U.S. Notes 
(a rather large sum in the 1860s), considered by many a financial 
necessity to finance the North’s military effort in the Civil 
 
 317 Perhaps Samra sees “neoliberalism” as having the same kind of mesmerizing 
effect on populist movements that phrases like “freedom of contract” and “property rights” 
have on the leaders at the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.  The 
latter terms, however, like “free trade” itself, embody a system of institutional double-
standards. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Deconstructing the Mythology of Free Trade: Critical 
Reflections on Comparative Advantage, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 65, 67, 68 n.12 (2006). 
 318 KLEIN, supra note 302, at 204. 
 319 Of course, words like “left” and “right” and “center” are short-hand terms that are 
useful to move the discussion forward, efficient ways of describing relatively coherent 
political orientations characterized by lesser or greater degrees of support for economic 
regulation, social policy, military intervention, and a host of other policies.  Perhaps 
Samra knows of some other way of describing such political orientations, but more likely 
his criticism of these terms is intended to simply prevent any critical discussion from 
taking place at all. 
 320 Samra, supra note 6, at 75 (quoting MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, 
supra note 19, at 69). 
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War.321  But rather than discuss the many historical periods 
when currency issuance was used successfully to activate 
demand, activate supply, and spur economic development,322 it is 
so much more convenient for Samra to quickly raise the specter 
again of Hugo Chávez whom he claims has been “‘catastrophic’ 
for the region.”323  Does Samra offer any empirical evidence of the 
catastrophe resulting from Chávez’s monetary policies?  No.  He 
offers no discussion or acknowledge-ment of the empirical 
evidence showing a decline in poverty and more equitable 
distributions of income under Chávez.  Instead, his only support 
for “the Chávez catastrophe” comes from The Perfect Idiot co-
authors, the three Latin American journalists who lack any 
economic training or scholarly pretense.324 
There is a final ad hominem attack that Samra offers 
against my own work: “[G]iven the collective Latin American 
experience over the last half-century, what is perhaps most 
striking about the sorts of arguments advanced by Professor 
Canova is their dogged persistence.”325  Recall that the reader is 
never provided with any empirical support to ascertain any 
collective Latin American experience over the last half century 
other than the flawed empirical studies that purport to correlate 
central bank independence with low inflation, and the very non-
empirical conclusions of The Perfect Idiot co-authors and several 
other ideologues.  Regardless, Samra contrasts my purported 
stridency (and dogged stridency at that326) with the “more 
 
 321 See Timothy A. Canova, Lincoln’s Populist Sovereignty: Public Finance Of, By, and 
For the People, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 561, 565–66 (2009). 
 322 Id. at 569–74. 
 323 Samra, supra note 6, at 75. 
 324 Id. at 75 n.75 (citing MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 
69).  The Perfect Idiot trio also denounce John Maynard Keynes for providing the 
intellectual support for a mixed economy, government planning and intervention, and 
“monetary issuance as a way of reactivating demand and making up for the shortage of 
resources.” MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 69.  They also 
denounce the British welfare state as perfect idiocy that “has in fact generated 
catastrophic policies” in Latin America. Id.  Nowhere is there any balanced discussion, 
nowhere any critical consideration of the empirical evidence.  Instead, it is the same 
name-calling, guilt-by-association, and cartoonish condemnations.  What a contrast to a 
thoughtful conservative like Judge Richard Posner who is not afraid to re-think his views 
in light of changing circumstances, empirical evidence, and theoretical inquiry. Richard A. 
Posner, How I Became a Keynesian, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 23, 2009, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.tnr.com/article/how-i-became-keynesian (conceding his conversion to 
Keynesian economics was prompted by reading Keynes’s The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest, and Money for the first time). 
 325 Samra, supra note 6, at 76. 
 326 Id. at 65, 70–76.  Apparently, according to Samra, populists are to be considered 
doggedly persistent, strident, grandiloquent, pompous, single-minded, frenzied, and 
fixated on immediate short-term results, while libertarian-conservatives are considered 
principled, consistent, forceful, even-keeled, wise, and concerned about long-term 
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cautious note” expressed by Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve 
chairman, that political elites and the broader public in Latin 
America should favor fiscal discipline, tree trade, and free 
markets.327  This statement by Bernanke was made in 2005, at a 
time when he was promoting freedom for large financial 
institutions to do as they pleased in the subprime mortgage 
market, the market for securitized assets, and the market for 
derivative financial instruments.  Of course, as many predicted, 
that experiment in deregulation ended badly. 
Since then, Gentle Ben has been particularly gentle to his 
Wall Street clientele while preaching fiscal discipline for the 
middle class.  He has supported extension of the Bush tax cuts 
for the wealthiest one percent of U.S. households, and he has 
used the Federal Reserve’s power to create money on a grand 
scale, opening the monetary spigots to quench the thirst of a 
rather narrow constituency, a Wall Street cartel that has become 
increasingly out of touch with Main Street.328 
For all of Samra’s sound and fury and name-calling, he is 
correct about one thing.  Those who advocate for accountability in 
central banking and for renewed economic democracy are indeed 
persistent.  Aspirations for justice and economic freedom, 
including freedom from want and freedom from fear, are 
perennial.  The recent efforts in Congress to reform the Federal 
Reserve suggest that this persistence is making slow but steady 
progress. 
IV.  PERSISTENCE OF REFORM:  CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Conservative jurists and legal scholars routinely criticize the 
modern administrative state for overly broad delegations of 
lawmaking power from Congress to bureaucratic agencies.329  
 
results—even as he engages in his breathless “ominous warnings” of “terrifying” 
consequences and impending doom. 
 327 Id. at 76. 
 328 Perhaps Samra and other gatekeepers of discourse will take exception to the use 
of the term “Main Street” as another false dichotomy between those who have plenty 
(Wall Street) and those who have less (the middle and lower classes), and as an “old 
scholastic stratagem” to vilify anyone who disagrees by lodging another anathema “into 
the public conscience through frenzied repetition.” Id. at 75. 
 329 Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner’s Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisdprudence 
of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 346 (1995).  See generally The Constitution and 
the Economy: Accountability and Autonomy in a Time of Financial Market and Regulatory 
Transformations, Association of American Law Schools (AALS) 2010 Annual Meeting Hot 
Topic Programs (Jan. 7, 2010) [hereinafter The Constitution and the Economy], available 
at https://memberaccess.aals.org/eWeb/DynamicPage.aspx?Site=AALS&WebKey= 
b8e081a5-3c1b-41ca-8c1f-c9d84b62a02f&RegPath=EventRegFees&REg_evt_key= 
e95fe6b3-00bd-4570-950c-d1bfa09e510c.  In this panel discussion, conservative scholar 
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Liberal scholars and jurists are more likely to defend broad 
delegations that allow administrative agencies to operate with 
enormous policy-making discretion.330  This is unfortunate since 
such broad delegations often invite “agency capture,” the 
dynamic in which regulated industries are able to influence and 
dominate the agencies charged with their regulation.  The 
symbiotic relationships between regulators, legislators, and 
private industry are often referred to as “iron triangles,” with 
each group exchanging favors to remain entrenched at the 
expense of the general public, taxpayers, and consumers.331 
In September 2010, Reuters published a special investigation 
report of the Federal Reserve’s selective disclosure of sensitive 
information about monetary policy to its favored clientele in the 
private financial sector.  These backroom exchanges are among 
the many quid pro quos in a system of opaque subsidies and part 
of a bigger problem of private financial influence over economic 
decision-making.332  It is the Public Choice school that has 
perhaps most thoroughly analyzed the market for legislation and 
political favors: private industry provides significant campaign 
contributions to Congress and lobbies on behalf of agency 
prerogatives while also providing lucrative jobs for their allies 
when they retire from the legislative branch and regulatory 
agencies—the so-called “revolving door” phenomenon.333 
The present financial crisis has added to our understanding 
of agency capture in at least two important ways.  First, we see 
that the “revolving door” swings both ways as private industry 
 
Richard Epstein criticized the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) as an abuse of 
discretion by the Treasury Department, while liberal scholar Mark Tushnet defended 
broad delegations as consistent with the requirements of the modern administrative state.  
This author questioned the constitutionality of the Federal Reserve as a violation of the 
Appointments Clause and the private non-delegation doctrine.  For audio, see 
http://www.aalsweb.org/2010podcasts/thursday/hottopicstheconstitutionoftheeconomy.mp
3. 
 330 David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative 
State, 89 GEO. L. J. 97, 141 (2000).  See generally The Constitution and the Economy, 
supra note 329.  Today, conservative hostility to the modern administrative state takes 
the form of privatization and fiscal austerity, major features of the Washington 
Consensus policy agenda.  With the courts no longer vigilant about scrutinizing 
delegations, the action has shifted to Congress to downsize the administrative state by 
keeping the agencies underfunded while privatizing more and more of their functions.  
This agenda has the perverse effect of making administrators more dependent on 
industry alliances and therefore more susceptible to capture. 
 331 Timothy A. Canova, Campaign Finance, Iron Triangles & the Decline of American 
Political Discourse, 12 NEXUS 57, 58 (2007). 
 332 Cooke et al., supra note 205. 
 333 See generally Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 
(1988) (discussing the economic theory of legislation); Stigler, supra note 193; Sam 
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211 (1976); 
Canova, Financial Market Failure, supra note 15, at 384. 
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officials take on key roles in government and then move easily 
back to the private sector.  For instance, Robert Rubin moved 
from Goldman Sachs to the Clinton White House and Treasury 
Department, and then back to Citigroup.334  Former President 
Bill Clinton earned more than $109 million within seven years of 
leaving the White House, nearly half as a speaker hired by large 
financial companies that contributed to Hillary Clinton’s 2008 
presidential campaign.335  It should not be forgotten that the 
Clinton administration did more to deregulate financial 
institutions than perhaps any administration since the 1920s.336  
Likewise, there are many similar examples involving central 
bank officials.  For instance, Alan Greenspan, before chairing the 
Fed, was a board member of J.P. Morgan.337  After leaving the 
Fed, Greenspan landed on his feet advising the Pacific 
Investment Management Company (Pimco), the world’s largest 
mutual fund, as well as Deutsche Bank’s investment banking 
team.338 
The second development made apparent in recent years is 
the way top central bank and government officials revolve not 
into traditional salaried positions but into investment 
opportunities with hedge funds and private equity firms.  For 
instance, former Fed vice chairman David Mullins became a 
partner in Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund that 
became extremely overleveraged in 1998, suffered catastrophic 
losses on derivative bets, and required a multibillion dollar 
assistance package brokered by the New York Fed.339  Larry 
Summers, after serving as Treasury secretary in the Clinton 
administration and before chairing the National Economic 
Council in the Obama White House, became a managing director 
for D.E. Shaw & Co., one of the nation’s largest hedge funds.340  
Meanwhile, former President Clinton brought in more than 
$15 million from a private equity investment partnership.341  
Perhaps more troubling, if that is possible, is the path of Alan 
Greenspan, who after leaving the Fed became an advisor at 
 
 334 Canova, Financial Market Failure, supra note 15, at 386–87. 
 335 Matthew Mosk, James V. Grimaldi & Joe Stephens, Clintons Earned $109 Million 
in 8 Years, WASH. POST, April 5, 2008, at A1. 
 336 See Canova, Financial Market Failure, supra note 15, at 387. 
 337 Alan Greenspan Says Risk Was Underpriced, WHARTON NEWS (Oct. 20, 2008), 
http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/news/featured-story2966.cfm. 
 338 PIMCO Hires Greenspan as Consultant, REUTERS (May 16, 2007, 7:30 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1546703720070516; Alan Greenspan to Consult for 
Deutsche Bank Corporate and Investment Bank, DEUTSHE BANK (Aug. 13, 2007), 
http://www.db.com/presse/en/content/press_releases_2007_3606.htm. 
 339 See Canova, Financial Market Failure, supra note 15, at 387. 
 340 Id. 
 341 See Mosk, Grimaldi & Stephens, supra note 335. 
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Paulson & Co, a giant U.S. hedge fund that earned billions of 
dollars in 2007 “when it [correctly] called the collapse in the sub-
prime mortgage market,” a collapse which has been widely 
blamed on Greenspan for keeping interest rates low while 
neglecting any meaningful regulation of financial institutions.342 
Each of these revolving door and “revolving hedge fund” 
examples raises the appearance of impropriety and the 
possibility of outright quid pro quo corruption, and suggests that 
the private financial sector has already compromised and largely 
captured our “independent” central bank as well as elected 
branches of government.343  The corruption of the elected 
branches raises issues beyond the scope of this article, including 
proposals to reform the political process, campaign finance and 
election laws that have entrenched a feeble two-party system.344  
However, even the presently compromised Congress, responding 
to pressure from an outraged public, managed to enact provisions 
in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 that should provide some measure of increased 
transparency for the Federal Reserve. 
The dynamics of agency capture and unaccountable central 
banking also raises important rule of law and constitutional 
concerns.  The first sentence of the Constitution states that all 
legislative powers shall be vested in Congress.345  When Congress 
delegates its legislative powers to an administrative agency 
without providing any guidance or limitations on the agency’s 
exercise of discretion, it runs afoul of the so-called nondelegation 
doctrine.346  Courts therefore require that Congress provide an 
“intelligible principle” to guide agency action.347  Although courts 
are often satisfied with rather vague and indeterminate 
 
 342 Angela Monaghan, Greenspan to Join Paulson as Advisor, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 
16, 2008, at B4. 
 343 In 1996, it was revealed that the Federal Reserve had amassed a $3.7 billion 
contingency fund (it was unclear what this slush fund was intended to be used for), and 
was favoring certain sources in its contracting and procurement, thereby raising conflict 
of interest concerns. Richard W. Stevenson, Study Criticizes Federal Reserve as Lax 
Manager, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1996, at A1.  These revelations certainly pale by 
comparison with the trillions of dollars in Federal Reserve spending in more recent years. 
 344 Kiersh, supra note 212 (documenting that the financial sector is “far and away the 
largest source of contributions to federal candidates”). 
 345 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 1. 
 346 See generally Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 
(1937).  See also Nadine Strossen, Delegation as a Danger to Liberty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV 
861, 863–64 (1999) (outlining four ways in which the delegation of Congress’ 
constitutionally defined lawmaking power undercuts the protection of liberty). 
 347 Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 317–18 (2000) 
(dismissing the nondelegation doctrine without reference to delegations to private 
groups). 
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delegation standards,348 agency discretion is also confined by 
Congress through a tapestry of procedural requirements imposed 
by legislation, including the Administrative Procedure Act,349 the 
Freedom of Information Act,350 the Government in the Sunshine 
Act,351 and the Federal Advisory Committee Act.352 
The elected branches also retain some practical ability in 
confining agency discretion when the delegations are made to 
public administrative agencies, to officials who are appointed by 
the President and confirmed by the Senate, and when there is 
ongoing budgetary oversight by Congress.  How much more 
problematic when the delegation is being made to an ostensibly 
private agency, in which top administrators are not appointed by 
the President or confirmed by the Senate, and there is no 
budgetary oversight by Congress—the exact kind of private 
delegation granted to the Federal Reserve.  Judicial insistence on 
an intelligible principle is far less meaningful for a private 
delegation since privately appointed officials can more easily defy 
intelligible principles and other policy guidance provided by the 
legislative branch. 
During the early- to mid-1930s, when the Supreme Court 
was striking down New Deal legislation, often in narrow 5 to 4 
votes, there was a consensus among liberal and conservative 
justices that such private delegations were illegitimate and 
unconstitutional, a violation of the so-called private 
nondelegation doctrine.353  In 1935, a unanimous Supreme Court 
in A.L.A Schechter Poultry v. United States (the so-called “Sick 
Chicken case”) struck down the National Recovery 
Administration (NRA), the centerpiece of the early New Deal, as 
an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking power.354  The NRA, 
like the Federal Reserve, was concerned with price stability, only 
this time it was attempting to stop a deflationary spiral by 
setting minimum prices and wages through private industry 
 
 348 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 424 (1944) (upholding the Office of 
Price Administration’s authority to impose price controls because Congress provided an 
intelligible principle to guide administrators by mandating that prices set be “generally 
fair and equitable”). 
 349 See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (2007).  
George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from 
New Deal Politics, 90 N.W. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1996) (describing the APA as “the bill 
of rights for the new regulatory state”). 
 350 See generally Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2007). 
 351 See generally Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2007). 
 352 See generally Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 1 et seq. (2007). 
 353 See, e. g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (“This is legislative 
delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an 
official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be 
and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business.”). 
 354 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935). 
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trade councils which were dominated by the largest firms in each 
industry.355  Justice Cardozo, in his concurring opinion, 
characterized the delegation to these private industry trade 
councils as a “delegation running riot.”356 
Since the late 1930s, the Court has routinely upheld the 
authority of administrative agencies through a more expansive 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, while largely ignoring 
delegation challenges as long as Congress provided some 
intelligible principle in the delegation.357  Many scholars have 
criticized this lack of judicial scrutiny of democratic processes 
ever since.  For instance, in Democracy and Distrust, John Hart 
Ely lamented the demise of the nondelegation doctrine as a 
“death by association” with pre-1937 substantive due process 
decisions and narrow readings of the Commerce Clause: “when 
those doctrines died the nondelegation doctrine died along with 
them.”358 
Delegations to private entities are particularly troubling for 
rule of law purposes.  According to Mark Bernstein: 
Even if one accepts the necessity of broad delegations of legislative 
power, the sharing of that power with private interests raises 
questions about the recipients’ conflict of interest and accountability 
and about agency capture.  The risk is not only that power will be 
concentrated, but that it potentially may be concentrated in those 
unaccountable for their actions.359 
As Bernstein further recognized, since such delegations can 
shortcut the legislative process, they also create a separation of 
power issue and threaten “to upset the delicate balance of 
institutional interests that the framers believed would check the 
influence of factions.”360 
 
 355 Id. at 550. 
 356 Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
 357 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
132 (1980). 
 358 Id. at 132, 133.  Likewise, such leading political scientists as Theodore Lowi have 
derided broad delegations to administrative agencies. THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF 
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 96–97 (2d ed. 1979).  See also 
Alan Brinkley, The Challenge to Deliberative, in THE NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS: ESSAYS IN 
DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 23, 25 (Alan Brinkley, Nelson W. Polsby & Kathleen M. 
Sullivan eds., 1997) (arguing that an anti-populist critique of deliberative democracy “is 
visible in the extraordinary, and largely unchallenged, authority of presumed experts on 
the Federal Reserve Board to chart the course of our economy”). 
 359 Mark F. Bernstein, Note, The Federal Open Market Committee and the Sharing of 
Governmental Power with Private Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV. 111, 127 (1989). 
 360 Id. at 127 n.72 (citing David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers 
that Be: Constitutional Purposes of Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 372–73 
(1987)). 
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The Federal Reserve is indeed “the poster child of an 
unconstitutional private delegation.”361  Like the NRA, which was 
struck down in Schechter Poultry, the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) is dominated by private actors.362  The 
presidents of the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks 
participate on the FOMC are appointed by privately selected 
board members.363  Meanwhile, unlike delegations to public 
agencies, the Federal Reserve does not rely on Congress for 
budgetary appropriations since it is effectively able to print 
money by simply purchasing government securities (and now 
toxic assets) with Federal Reserve Notes and credits representing 
Federal Reserve Notes.364  In addition, the Federal Reserve is 
exempt in whole or in part from much of the tapestry of 
administrative procedural requirements that apply to most other 
federal agencies.365 
The private nature of the regional Federal Reserve Banks 
may also skew the dynamics of the publicly appointed Board of 
Governors (BOG).366  The seven members of the BOG, who serve 
for fourteen-year terms, are likely to be pre-screened in the 
appointments process to prevent any nominees who would 
challenge the private nature of the regional Federal Reserve 
Banks, the composition of the FOMC, or the prerogatives of the 
largest private bank members of the system—the so-called “Too 
Big To Fail” banks.367  For instance, the Federal Reserve is 
provided with considerable discretion in its open market 
operations, deciding what assets to purchase from which 
financial settings, as well as in setting capital standards for 
individual banks, bringing formal capital enforcement actions, 
entering written agreements, ordering hearings, imposing cease 
and desist orders, ordering prompt corrective action directives, 
appointing a receiver, and conducting “stress tests” to determine 
 
 361 Once again, I credit the late John Hart Ely, for this description of the Federal 
Reserve. See Canova, Closing the Border, supra note 224, at 407 n.326. 
 362 Bernstein, supra note 359, at 111. 
 363 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 1947, supra note 2, 
at 53–54; Canova, Closing the Border, supra note 224, at 407. 
 364 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 1947, supra note 2, 
at 2, 62–64. 
 365 See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2007) (providing exemption 
for certain Federal Reserve directives and information that is part of its deliberative 
process); Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 4 (b) (2007) (exempting any 
advisory committee of two entities, the Federal Reserve System and the Central 
Intelligence Agency, from provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act). 
 366 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 1947, supra note 2, 
at 56. 
 367 Id. See also Too Big to Fail, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/too-big-to-fail.html (last visited Jan. 6, 
2011). 
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how much capital is needed by the largest bank holding 
companies.368  Such discretion presents challenges for fair 
enforcement and supervision by any federal agency, such as the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency.  The problem becomes magnified 
when the discretion is vested in an institution like the Federal 
Reserve that is largely directed by the financial industry. 
Although there have been numerous challenges to the 
Federal Reserve System in the 1970s and 1980s on Appointments 
Clause and nondelegation grounds, all have been dismissed by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on narrow 
procedural grounds (and the Supreme Court has denied 
certiorari).369  The D.C. Circuit has held that private plaintiffs 
lack standing because they cannot show any injury caused 
directly by the Federal Reserve since they lack any privity of 
contract with the Fed.370  When the plaintiff has been a U.S. 
Senator, the court has created the doctrine of “equitable 
discretion” to avoid ruling on the substantive merits.371  If 
standing and justiciability could be found in some future case, 
perhaps for a private financial institution or state governments 
challenging the Fed’s denial of assistance, the issue may turn to 
redressability. 
Most recently, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. 
Accounting Oversight Board,372 the Supreme Court struck down 
the removal provisions of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB),373 a creation of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002,374 since PCAOB board members could be removed 
only for good cause by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and the SEC Commissioners could in turn only be removed 
by the President for good cause.375  In his dissenting opinion, 
Justice Breyer warned of a host of other federal agencies that 
may be put in jeopardy by the majority’s ruling, and he included 
 
 368 Julie Andersen Hill, Ad Hoc Bank Capital Requirements 3–5, 8, 11, 15, 19, 21–22, 
37 (July 7, 2010) (working draft) (on file with author). 
 369 Canova, Closing the Border, supra note 224, at 404–05 n.309–11, 313 (citing 
Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (dismissed on grounds of 
equitable discretion); Comm. for Monetary Reform v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., 766 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dismissed for lack of standing); Riegle v. Fed. Open 
Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (dismissed on grounds of equitable discretion); 
Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978) 
(dismissed for lack of standing)). 
 370 Id. at 404.  See also Reuss, 584 F.2d at 470–71. 
 371 Canova, Closing the Border, supra note 224, at 404. 
 372 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 373 Id. at 3147. 
 374 Id. 
 375 Id. 
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the Federal Reserve Board although its members are subject to 
good cause removal by the President.376  Justice Breyer follows a 
long line of liberal scholars, including most famously Cass 
Sunstein, who confuse the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 
properly appointed by the President of the United States and 
confirmed by the Senate, with the constitutionally far more 
problematic presidents of the regional Federal Reserve Banks 
who sit on the Federal Open Market Committee.377  Of particular 
importance in light of Free Enterprise Fund is the fact that those 
regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents are removed only by 
the privately-elected boards of directors of the privately-owned 
regional Federal Reserve Banks.378  It appears that for any 
challenge to the Federal Reserve System, the Free Enterprise 
Fund holding would provide redressability in the form of striking 
down the removal provisions of the regional Federal Reserve 
Bank presidents. 
It is not surprising that unelected judges would be reluctant 
to rule on the substantive merits and strike down key features of 
the nation’s central bank.  Nor that public opinion and populist 
dissatisfaction with Wall Street bailouts finally pushed Congress 
to act—even a Congress so compromised and influenced by Wall 
Street campaign contributions.  Significantly, the impetus for 
action came not from the center, but from the populist libertarian 
right joining hands with the populist progressive left.  
Representative Ron Paul, a Republican libertarian from Texas, 
introduced a bill to subject the Federal Reserve to an audit by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the non-partisan 
investigative arm of Congress.379  Ron Paul’s bill was cosponsored 
on the left by such Democratic and progressive Congressmen as 
Dennis Kucinich from Ohio and Alan Grayson from Florida.380  
Until now, the Federal Reserve’s exercise of monetary policy has 
evaded such scrutiny.  But the trillions of dollars in opaque 
Federal Reserve subsidies for Wall Street interests finally fueled 
 
 376 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 08-861, slip op. at 39 
(U.S. June 28, 2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 377 Canova, Closing the Border, supra note 224, at 404 n.310. 
 378 Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 341 Fifth (2000).  Unlike the PCAOB removal 
provision that was struck down in Free Enterprise Fund, the President of the United 
States has no role, direct or attenuated, in the removal of Federal Reserve Bank 
presidents.  Free Enterprise Fund restricts PCAOB board members to a single level of 
insulation from the President; Federal Reserve Bank presidents are completely insulated 
from the President of the United States. See Ira Stoll, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 
FUTUREOFCAPITALISM.COM (June 28, 2010, 12:39 PM), http://www.futureofcapitalism.com/ 
2010/06/free-enterprise-fund-v-pcaob. 
 379 Arnold Kling, The Case for Auditing the Fed is Obvious, CATO INSTITUTE BRIEFING 
PAPERS no. 118, Apr. 27, 2010, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/bp/bp118.pdf. 
 380 Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2009, H.R. 1207, 111th Cong. (2009), 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR01207:@@@P. 
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reform efforts.  Inquiring minds wanted to know who the Federal 
Reserve has showered with its largesse—which “Too Big To Fail” 
Wall Street banks and which politically connected hedge funds—
and the terms of such support, including the price paid for toxic 
assets and the collateral required for Fed loans. 
In December 2009, the House passed a financial regulatory 
reform bill by a vote of 223 to 202 which incorporated several 
provisions on reforming the Federal Reserve, including the GAO 
audit provision.381  The Senate passed a financial reform bill in 
May 2010 that included a provision that would have required the 
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be 
appointed by the president of the United States and confirmed by 
the Senate.382  The Senate bill also prohibited bank officers from 
serving on the boards of the twelve regional Federal Reserve 
Banks and voting for the regional bank presidents.383  In 
addition, the Senate voted 96 to 0 to include a provision requiring 
a one-time audit of the Federal Reserve by GAO, a measure that 
was pushed from the left by Senator Bernard Sanders, an 
independent from Vermont.384 
With two differing versions of financial regulatory reform, 
the legislation moved to a House-Senate Conference Committee, 
where reform efforts often get watered down or die.  The final 
version of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) did not include any significant 
change in the appointment of any of the regional Federal Reserve 
Bank presidents.385  Previously, they were appointed by the 
boards of directors of the regional Federal Reserve Banks, which 
consists of three Class A directors representing the commercial 
bank members of the Federal Reserve district, three Class B 
directors also elected by the same commercial banks but 
purporting to represent the public, and three Class C directors 
appointed by the Board of Governors.386  Under section 1107 of 
the Act, the regional presidents will now be appointed by the 
 
 381 Comparing the House and Senate Financial Reform Bills, N.Y. TIMES,  
Mar. 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/03/16/business/financialreform-
billcompare.html#tab=2. 
 382 Id. 
 383 Id. 
 384 David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Votes Unanimously for an Audit of Fed’s Actions in 
Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at B3; Alan Grayson, We Beat the Fed, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 11, 2010, 10:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-alan-
grayson/we-beat-the-fed_b_572713.html. 
 385 In the Senate version, section 1157 proposed that the President of the United 
States appoint the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for a term of five 
years. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) (Senate version).  However, this proposal was not in 
the final version signed by President Obama. See infra note 388 and accompanying text. 
 386 THE FEDERAL RESERVE: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 2005, supra note 4, at 10. 
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Class B and Class C directors of the regional Federal Reserve 
Banks, with the approval of the Board of Governors.387  This is a 
baby step in the right direction, but with the Federal Reserve 
System already captured by the big banking interests, limiting 
the appointment process to Class B and Class C directors will 
likely have no actual impact on outcomes. 
In addition, the prohibition against bank officers serving on 
the boards of the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks was 
dropped by the Conference Committee and did not appear in the 
final Dodd-Frank Act.388  However, the Comptroller General is 
now required to complete an audit of the governance of the 
Federal Reserve Banks, including an examination of whether the 
current system of appointing Federal Reserve Bank directors 
effectively represents the public “with due but not exclusive 
consideration to the interests of agriculture, commerce, industry, 
services, labor, and consumers.”389  The audit must also “examine 
whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest created 
when directors of the Federal reserve banks” are elected by 
member banks.390  Finally, the audit is charged with identifying 
changes to the selection procedures for Federal Reserve Bank 
directors that would improve how the public is represented, 
eliminate actual or potential conflicts of interest in bank 
supervision, and increase the availability of information and 
Federal Reserve transparency, effectiveness and efficiency.391 
More controversial were the provisions dealing with the GAO 
audit of the Federal Reserve’s open market operations and 
lending facilities over the past two years, as well as Federal 
Reserve’s transparency provisions.  It is worth wading through 
the maze of statutory provisions to understand the subterfuges 
attempted by the Federal Reserve and its allies in the Conference 
Committee.  According to section 1109(a), the GAO will conduct a 
one-time audit of all loans and other financial assistance 
provided by the Federal Reserve System during the period 
beginning December 1, 2007 and ending on the date of enactment 
of the Dodd-Frank Act.392  This, at first glance, seems to be a 
 
 387 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4173, 
111th Cong. (2010) § 1107(a).  In addition, § 1108 (d) limits the ability of the Board of 
Governors to delegate certain authority to the presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks. 
 388 The Senate version of section 1157 proposed that no officer, past or current, may 
serve on the board of directors. H.R. 1157, 111th Cong. (2010) (Senate version).  This 
prohibition did not appear in the final version signed by President Obama; instead, an 
audit is required. See infra note 389. 
 389 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4173, 
111th Cong. (2010) § 1109 (b)(1)(B)(i). 
 390 § 1109 (b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 391 § 1109 (b)(1)(B)(iv). 
 392 The Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) Purchase Program, by which the Federal 
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success for transparency efforts since the GAO audit should 
apparently cover the several trillion dollars in loans and outright 
purchases made by the Federal Reserve since the onset of the 
financial crisis. 
However, section 102(a) prevents the Comptroller General 
from disclosing “to any person or entity, including Congress, the 
names or identifying details of specific participants in 
any . . . covered transaction” including the amounts transferred 
in any covered transaction.393  GAO disclosure can only occur if 
the Board of Governors first decides to publicly disclose the 
identity or identifying details of the transaction.394  There is 
concern that these provisions could be used to effectively prevent 
disclosure by either the Federal Reserve or the GAO of any of the 
trillions of dollars of Federal Reserve loans and open-market 
purchases conducted between the beginning of the financial crisis 
in late 2007 and July 2010.395 
However, section 1109(c), the final provision in the Title XI 
Federal Reserve provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, required the 
Board of Governors to publish on its website no later than 
December 1, 2010 the identities of each business, individual, 
entity, or foreign central bank that has received specifically listed 
Federal Reserve loans and financial assistance beginning on 
 
Reserve purchased some $1.25 trillion in toxic assets, is indeed covered by the GAO’s one-
time audit as an expressly listed program (it is specifically listed as “the agency-
guaranteed mortgage-backed securities program”).  According to the Federal Reserve, the 
MBS Purchase Program for large-scale asset purchases (LSAP) was conducted pursuant 
to section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act (and therefore was not within the Fed’s section 
13(3) powers). See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve 
System Monthly Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet  
January 2010, at 4 (2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/ 
monthlyclbsreport201001.pdf; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal 
Reserve System Monthly Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet 
March 2010, at 4, 5 (Mar. 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/ 
monthlyclbsreport201003.pdf. 
 393 § 1102(a). 
 394 Id.  Presumably, the GAO would not be empowered to disclose the details of non-
covered transactions.  Meanwhile, according to section 1102 the Board of Governors must 
disclose the names and identifying details of each counterparty in any covered 
transaction. Id. (enacting a new section 11(s) of the Federal Reserve Act).  However, 
section 1102 requires Federal Reserve to disclose identifying details of only certain 
transactions conducted after the date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.  The GAO’s 
non-disclosure obligation expires with respect to any transaction “on the date on which 
the Board of Governors, directly or through a Federal reserve bank, publicly discloses the 
identity” or identifying details of any transaction. Id.  Therefore, when the Board of 
Governors discloses details of any post-July 2010 transaction, the GAO may at that time 
also disclose such details.  But the inverse is also true, that as long as the Board of 
Governors does not disclose details of any post-July 2010 transaction, the GAO may not 
disclose such details. 
 395 While the GAO should be able to audit Federal Reserve loans and open-market 
transactions under section 1109, the GAO would apparently be prevented from disclosing 
the identities and identifying details of these transactions under section 1102. Id.; § 1109. 
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December 1, 2007.396  Why, one might ask, were these provisions 
so convoluted?  Why prevent the GAO from disclosing identifying 
information when the Federal Reserve is required to do so on its 
website, and why tack that latter requirement onto the very final 
section of the legislation?  According to a Capitol Hill staffer who 
worked on this legislation, “When you are fighting the Fed and 
the Senate and Treasury and they won’t show you language, this 
is what happens.”397 
On December 1, 2010, the Fed complied with section 1109(c) 
by disclosing the identities of those receiving some $3.3 trillion in 
Federal Reserve loans and financial assistance.  The list of wards 
of the Fed included the largest financial institutions in the 
United States and abroad, a who’s who of Wall Street and foreign 
banks.398 
Finally, section 1103(b) states expressly that it is not 
intended to affect any pending litigation or lawsuit previously 
filed under 5 U.S.C. § 552, the Freedom of Information Act.399  
This provision was meant to protect suits that had been filed 
against the Federal Reserve by Bloomberg News and other media 
outlets seeking the identity of financial institutions receiving 
emergency Federal Reserve loans from the Federal Reserve’s 
discount window and the collateral posted for such assistance.400  
This was the one Fed lending program that Congress ultimately 
excluded from the transparency and disclosure requirements in 
the Dodd-Frank Act.401  Bloomberg News was granted summary 
judgment in August 2009 by the federal District Court for the 
Southern District of New York,402 which was affirmed by the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in March 2010.403  
Apparently there was no need for the Federal Reserve to appeal 
the decision to the Supreme Court.  The Clearing House 
 
 396 § 1109(c). 
 397 Email from unnamed Capitol Hill staffer to author, July 28, 2010 (adding, “The 
process was a clusterfuck done at the last minute”). Clusterfuck, URBANDICTIONARY.COM, 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=clusterfuck (last visited Jan. 8, 2011) 
(Clusterfuck is a “[m]ilitary term for an operation in which multiple things have gone 
wrong” and is related to SNAFU and FUBAR). 
 398 Craig Torres and Scott Lanman, Fed Names Recipients of $3.3 Trillion in Crisis 
Aid, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 1, 2010, 10:52 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-
01/fed-names-recipients-of-3-3-trillion-of-aid-during-u-s-financial-crisis.html. 
 399 § 1103(b) (enacting a new section 11(s)(8) of the Federal Reserve Act). 
 400 See generally Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. 
Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 401 Torres & Lanman, supra note 398. 
 402 Id. at 282. 
 403 Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 601 F.3d 143, 151 
(2d Cir. 2010). 
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Association LLC, a group of the biggest commercial banks in the 
country, filed for certiorari in October 2010.404 
The Fed has never disclosed the identities of borrowers of its 
discount window lending since the program was created in 
1914.405  As Senator Bernie Sanders said, the Dodd-Frank Act 
disclosure and transparency requirements is “a significant step 
forward in opening the veil of secrecy that exists in one of the 
most powerful agencies in government.”406  Whether or not the 
Fed is ultimately compelled to disclose details about its discount 
window lending, the information already disclosed under Dodd-
Frank contributes to our understanding of the Fed’s cozy 
relationship with Wall Street’s biggest banks and financial 
institutions.  Most recently, the Federal Reserve is engaged in its 
second round of quantitative easing (QE2), purchasing some $600 
billion in long-term Treasury securities in an attempt to push 
down mortgage interest rates and to prop up housing and 
consumption.407  The Fed’s disclosures under Dodd-Frank show 
how the first round of quantitative easing helped transfer $1.25 
trillion of toxic assets from the balance sheets of Wall Street’s 
 
 404 Bob Ivry & Greg Stohr, Fed Won’t Join Supreme Court on Loan Disclosures, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 26, 2010, 11:15 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-26/fed-
won-t-join-banks-appeal-to-high-court-over-emergency-loan-disclosures.html;  Pending 
Cases Involving the Board of Governors, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/legaldevelopmentscases.htm (last updated 
Jan. 19, 2011) (reporting the Clearing House filing as intervenor in Board of Governors v. 
Bloomberg, LP and Fox News Network v. Board of Governors); Bob Ivry, Fed Given 60 
Days for Supreme Court Appeal of Document Disclosure Order, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 
2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2010-08-27/federal-reserve-given-60-days-to-
appeal-disclosure-order-to-supreme-court.html. 
 405 Ivry & Stohr, supra note 404. 
 406 Torres & Lanman, supra note 398. 
 407 Wessel, supra note 204, at A4 (reporting that Quantitative Easing is “when the 
Fed turns up its electronic printing presses” and creates money to purchase financial 
assets).  Section 1101 of the Dodd-Frank Act continues to grant the Federal Reserve very 
broad discretion to engage in emergency lending—the Fed’s so-called section 13(3) lending 
authority—“for the purpose of providing liquidity to the financial system, and not to aid a 
failing company . . . .” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1101(a)(6)(B)(i) (2010).  There is nothing in the Dodd-Frank Act 
that would prevent the Federal Reserve from create new money to purchase more trillions 
of dollars in paper assets through open market transactions.  Paul Krugman has 
suggested that the Federal Reserve may need to purchase between $8 trillion and $10 
trillion in government bonds to produce a full recovery. Paul Krugman, On Quantitative 
Easing and the Currency Situation, CNBC (Oct. 13, 2010, 5:30 PM), available at 
http://www.marketobservation.com/blogs/index.php/2010/10/14/paul-krugman-on-
quantitative-easing-and-the-currency-situation?blog=10 (providing an audio broadcasting 
of Paul Krugman’s predictions).  This is another way of saying that the federal 
government needs to find outlets to spend on that scale.  The Federal Reserve already has 
all the authority it needs to purchase government bonds in any amount, while it would 
take an act of Congress to authorize the federal government to spend such amounts (or 
any amount) on economic recovery programs. 
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biggest banks to the Federal Reserve’s own balance sheet.408  
Meanwhile, as home foreclosures have climbed to an all-time 
high,409 economists on both sides of the spectrum have called on 
the Federal Reserve to lend directly to Main Street, from 
proposals to finance the write-down and modifications of 
mortgages to lending directly to local governments and for job 
creation through infrastructure investment.410  Unfortunately, 
these proposals have fallen on deaf ears at the Fed. 
The Federal Reserve sits at the center of these double 
standards.  Sanctity of contract and market discipline result in 
millions of underwater mortgages, foreclosed homes, and a 
broken American Dream.  But for powerful Wall Street insiders, 
failure is rewarded through the central bank’s programs such as 
quantitative easing.  This is essentially free money for the 
interests that have captured the central bank, while state and 
local governments around the United States, and sovereign 
borrowers elsewhere face rising interest rates and negative 
assessments from the credit rating agencies tied to the big banks.  
Populist proposals to reverse these trends are routinely 
dismissed by Washington and Wall Street.  One such proposal, 
for the Federal Reserve or Treasury to provide interest-free loans 
to state and local governments for capital investment projects, 
has met orthodox opposition.411  For instance, Don Brash, the 
former head of New Zealand’s central bank, indicated his concern 
about the opportunity cost of having the government provide 
easy credit for public sector capital investment.412  However, as 
long as central bankers remain unaccountable there is no 
 
 408 Dick Armey & Matt Kibbe, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s Bailout Redux, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Nov. 4, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/op-eds/2010/11/dick-
armey-and-matt-kibbe-fed-chairman-ben-bernankes-bailout-redux; Larry Doyle, Barack 
Obama Has Ben Bernanke by the Balls, SENSE ON CENTS (Mar. 16, 2010, 3:23 PM), 
http://www.senseoncents.com/2010/03/barack-obama-has-ben-bernanke-by-the-balls/. 
 409 See Foreclosure Activity Hits Record High in Third Quarter, REALTYTRAC (Oct. 15, 
2009), http://www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure/foreclosure-rates.html (reporting a new high 
in quarterly mortgage foreclosure rate). 
 410 For instance, on the right, Nobel laureate Vernon Smith has proposed that the 
Federal Reserve finance lending modification of home mortgages. Vernon L. Smith, Mired 
in Disequilibrium: Do for Households What the Fed Sought for Banks, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 
24, 2011), http://www.newsweek.com/2011/01/23/mired-in-disequilibrium.html.  On the 
left, William Greider proposes that the Fed use its section 13(3) authority to lend to 
nonfinancial entities in “unusual and exigent circumstances” to lend directly to local 
governments and for building infrastructure and creating jobs. William Greider, Will the 
Federal Reserve’s $900 Billion Be Enough?, AGENCE GLOBAL (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2452. 
411 Canova, supra note 321, at 586–87 n.167–73 (discussing H.R. 1452, the State and 
Local Government Empowerment Act of 1999). 
 412 Discussion with Don Brash, Chapman University, Argyros Hall, Feb. 22, 2010.  
“[T]he opportunity cost of using a particular resource is defined as the value of the next 
best alternative use of that resource . . . .  ‘[W]henever you have a choice, there is a cost.’” 
HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 4 (1998). 
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incentive for them to ask what the opportunity cost is for 
providing trillions of dollars in support to Wall Street banks and 
hedge funds. 
The movement to reform central banks and make them 
accountable has been around for as long as there has been both 
democracy and privatized central banking.  Reigning in privilege 
and financial aristocracy was the basis for Jefferson’s opposition 
to the First Bank of the United States413 and Jackson’s veto of 
the recharter of the Second Bank of the United States.414  
Likewise, today many have come to see the independent Federal 
Reserve as the linchpin of a government-nurtured cartel and 
emblematic of the ossification of the political process.415  Without 
genuine accountability, independent central banking has become 
a euphemism for plutocracy and financial oligarchy. 
Those concerned about our present economic impasse must 
ask what kind of central bank we need.  They may find that the 
Federal Reserve we want looks a lot like the Federal Reserve we 
once had during the 1940s—strictly accountable to the elected 
branches and far more transparent and efficient in regulation 
than today.  Of course, there are other models of civic republic-
anism, such as a central bank that remains independent from 
direct executive branch political control, while including a fair 
representation of “business, labor, farmers, consumers,” debtors, 
and other constituencies that have been left outside the present 
system.416  This would transform the central bank into a 
marketplace for ideas, internalizing checks and balances, and a 
forum for what Madison called faction confronting faction.417 
It has been said that war is too important to be left to the 
generals.  Likewise, the economy is too important to be left to the 
bankers.  Yet, we have largely turned over the nation’s central 
bank to a self-interested banking elite.  The result has been to 
corrupt the culture of the central bank, entrench a system of self-
regulation for the biggest banks, and constrain fiscal policy at 
every level of government.  Ultimately, what is at stake is the 
nature of representative democracy itself. 
 
 413 Primary Source: Thomas Jefferson's Opinion on the National Bank, (PBS/KCET 
2008), http://www.pbs.org/kcet/andrewjackson/edu/jeffersononbank.pdf. 
 414 American President: Jackson Vetoes Bank Bill—July 10, 1832, Miller Center of 
Public Affairs, University of Virginia, http://millercenter.org/academic/americanpresident/ 
events/07_10. 
 415 Jacob Heilbrunn, Op-Ed., Bernanke Bashers, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010, at A27. 
 416 See, e.g., COMMONS, supra note 22, at 900–01; Whalen, supra note 84, at 564–65; 
KEYSERLING, supra note 22, at 111. 
 417 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 312, at 54–55. 
